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Chapter 2:
Meta-Analysis of Intra-Industry FDI Spillovers: Updated Evi-
dence
The present paper conducts a meta-analysis of literature on intra-industry produc-
tivity spillovers from foreign direct investment. Apart from the traditional approach,
robust meta-regression, random eﬀects model, and probit meta-regression are em-
ployed. Results of combined signiﬁcance analysis are mixed but it is apparent that
papers published in leading academic journals tend to report rather insigniﬁcant re-
sults. Our ﬁndings suggest that cross-sectional and industry-level studies are likely
to ﬁnd relatively strong spillover eﬀects, and that the choice of proxy for foreign
presence is important. The pattern, however, seems to weaken over time. Contrary
to previous studies, evidence for publication bias was not detected.
JEL Classiﬁcation C42, D62, F21, F23, O3
Keywords Meta-analysis, Productivity spillovers, Technology
transfer, Foreign direct investment, Multinational
corporations
Kapitola 2:
Meta-analy´za pˇreliv˚u produktivity z horizonta´ln´ıch FDI: Nova´
zjiˇsteˇn´ı
Prˇedkla´dana´ studie je meta-analy´zou literatury zkoumaj´ıc´ı prˇelivy produktivity z
prˇ´ımy´ch zahranicˇn´ıch investic na ﬁrmy hostitelske´ zemeˇ. Kromeˇ tradicˇn´ıho prˇ´ıstupu
pouzˇ´ıva´me take´ robustn´ı, panelovou a probitovou meta-regresi. Acˇkoli kombinovana´
signiﬁkance nen´ı jednoznacˇna´, je zrˇejme´, zˇe studie publikovane´ v nejprestizˇneˇjˇs´ıch
cˇasopisech maj´ı tendenci prezentovat sp´ıˇse nesigniﬁkantn´ı vy´sledky. Nasˇe zjiˇsteˇn´ı
naznacˇuj´ı, zˇe studie uzˇ´ıvaj´ıc´ı pr˚urˇezova´ data a odveˇtvovou agregaci obvykle nacha´zej´ı
signiﬁkantn´ı prˇelivy a zˇe volba proxy pro zahranicˇn´ı prˇ´ıtomnost vy´sledky vy´znamneˇ
ovlivnˇuje. Tyto efekty vsˇak nejsou natolik zrˇetelne´ u novy´ch cˇla´nk˚u. Narozd´ıl od
prˇedchoz´ıch studi´ı jsme da´le nenalezli stopy publikacˇn´ı zaujatosti.
JEL klasiﬁkace C42, D62, F21, F23, O3
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova meta-analy´za, prˇelivy produktivity, prˇenos tech-
nologi´ı, prˇ´ıme´ zahranicˇn´ı investice, nadna´rodn´ı spo-
lecˇnosti
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Chapter 3:
On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives
This paper examines the microeconomic motivation of governments to provide tax in-
centives for foreign direct investment. Author applies the classical models of oligopoly
to subsidy competition, endogenousing investment incentives, but leaving tax rates
exogenous. According to the conventional wisdom, subsidy competition leads to
overprovision of incentives. This paper suggests that, in the oligopolistic framework,
supranational coordination can either decrease or increase the supply of subsidies.
Further, in the setting of subsidy regulation, the host country’s corporate income tax
rate has an ambiguous eﬀect on the provision of incentives.
JEL Classiﬁcation F12, F21, F23, H25, H71, H87
Keywords Investment incentives, Subsidy competition, Pro-
ductivity spillovers, Oligopoly, Foreign direct in-
vestment, Multinational corporations
Kapitola 3:
Determinanty pob´ıdek pro zahranicˇn´ı investory
Tento cˇla´nek zkouma´ mikroekonomickou motivaci vla´d k poskytova´n´ı danˇovy´ch u´lev
zahranicˇn´ım investor˚um. Autor aplikuje klasicke´ modely oligopolu na situaci pob´ıd-
kove´ souteˇzˇe, kde investicˇn´ı pob´ıdky jsou endogenn´ı velicˇinnou, avsˇak danˇove´ sazby
exogenn´ı. Konvencˇn´ı moudrost rˇ´ıka´, zˇe pob´ıdkova´ souteˇzˇ ma´ za na´sledek nad-
produkci investicˇn´ıch pob´ıdek. Tento cˇla´nek naznacˇuje, zˇe v situaci oligopoln´ıho
souteˇzˇen´ı mu˚zˇe mı´t nadna´rodn´ı kooperace za na´sledek jak sn´ızˇen´ı, tak zvy´sˇen´ı posky-
tovany´ch pob´ıdek. Da´le je uka´za´no, zˇe v ra´mci regulace pob´ıdek ma´ sazba daneˇ z
prˇ´ıjmu pra´vnicky´ch osob v hostitelske´ zemi neurcˇity´ vliv na nab´ıdku danˇovy´ch u´lev
pro zahranicˇn´ı investory.
JEL klasiﬁkace F12, F21, F23, H25, H71, H87
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova investicˇn´ı pob´ıdky, pob´ıdkova´ souteˇzˇ, prˇelivy pro-
duktivity, oligopol, prˇ´ıme´ zahranicˇn´ı investice, nad-
na´rodn´ı spolecˇnosti
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Chapter 4:
Subsidy Competition for FDI: Fierce or Weak?
The objective of this paper is to empirically assess the recently introduced models
of subsidy competition based on the classical oligopoly theories, using both cross-
sectional and panel data. Three crucial scenarios (including coordination, weak com-
petition, and ﬁerce competition) are tested employing OLS, iteratively re-weighted
least squares, ﬁxed eﬀects, and Blundell-Bond estimator. The results suggest that
none of the scenarios can be strongly supported—although there is some weak sup-
port for cooperation—, and thus that empirical evidence is not in accordance with
the tested models. Further, it seems that by means of FDI incentives countries try to
compensate foreign investors for high wages and low productivity of their citizens.
JEL Classiﬁcation C21, C23, F21, F23, H25
Keywords Panel data, Investment incentives, Foreign direct in-
vestment, Subsidy competition
Kapitola 4:
Souteˇzˇ o pˇr´ıme´ zahranicˇn´ı investice: Ostra´ cˇi m´ırna´?
C´ılem tohoto cˇla´nku je empiricky zhodnotit neda´vno prˇedstavene´ modely pob´ıd-
kove´ho souperˇen´ı zalozˇene´ na klasicky´ch modelech oligopolu za pouzˇit´ı jak pr˚urˇe-
zovy´ch, tak panelovy´ch dat. Trˇi nejd˚ulezˇiteˇjˇs´ı sce´na´rˇe – nadna´rodn´ı koordinace
pob´ıdek, slaba´ souteˇzˇ a ostra´ souteˇzˇ – jsou testova´ny pomoc´ı klasicky´ch nejmensˇ´ıch
cˇtverc˚u, metody iteracˇn´ıch opakovaneˇ va´zˇeny´ch nejmensˇ´ıch cˇtverc˚u, ﬁxn´ıch efekt˚u a
Blundellova-Bondova estima´toru. Nasˇe vy´sledky naznacˇuj´ı, zˇe zˇa´dny´ z prˇedlozˇeny´ch
sce´na´rˇ˚u nemu˚zˇe by´t silneˇ podporˇen – acˇkoli existuje alesponˇ urcˇita´ slaba´ podpora pro
nadna´rodn´ı koordinaci –, a zˇe tedy empiricka´ evidence nen´ı v souladu s testovany´mi
modely. Ukazuje se take´, zˇe zemeˇ mohou nab´ızet vysoke´ pob´ıdky jako kompenzaci
zahranicˇn´ım investor˚um za vysoke´ mzdove´ na´klady a n´ızkou produktivitu.
JEL klasiﬁkace C21, C23, F21, F23, H25
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova panelova´ data, investicˇn´ı pob´ıdky, prˇ´ıme´ zahranicˇn´ı
investice, pob´ıdkova´ souteˇzˇ
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The presented thesis is a collection of 3 papers written during my graduate studies
at the Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
in Prague (2007–2009). Even though all chapters can be considered as independent
articles and each one focuses on a speciﬁc problem, they are complementary to each
other in their close relation to the issue of foreign direct investment incentives and
subsidy competition.
Chapter 2 presents an updated version of a paper which was written in collabo-
ration with Zuzana Irsˇova´ and published as IES working paper 2008/08. The article
received Honorable Mention by the President of the Czech Economic Society in the
Young Economist Award 2008 competition and has been submitted to International
Business Review. Zuzana Irsˇova´ helped me particularly with gathering data—60%
of the data were obtained due to her eﬀort, making the study one of the richest
meta-anylises conducted in international ﬁnance with 97 used results from 67 diﬀer-
ent papers. Zuzana also computed combined signiﬁcance (Table 2.1) and constructed
an informative table of all used studies (Table 2.7). I include these parts of Chap-
ter 2 with her kind permission. I am responsible for the text itself and all employed
regressions.
Chapter 2 conducts a meta-analysis of literature on intra-industry productivity
spillovers from foreign direct investment. Apart from the traditional approach, robust
meta-regression, random eﬀects model, and probit meta-regression are employed.
Results of combined signiﬁcance analysis are mixed but it is apparent that papers
published in leading academic journals tend to report rather insigniﬁcant results.
Our ﬁndings suggest that cross-sectional and industry-level studies are likely to ﬁnd
relatively strong spillover eﬀects, and that the choice of proxy for foreign presence is
important. The pattern, however, seems to weaken over time. Contrary to previous
studies, evidence for publication bias was not detected.
Chapter 3 introduces a broadly modiﬁed version of an essay that received Honor-
able Mention by the President of the Czech Economic Society in the Young Economist
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Award 2007 competition and was accepted for publication in Prague Economic Pa-
pers (June 2009 issue). An older version was published as IES working paper 2007/31
(in Czech). The working paper built heavily on my bachelor thesis which was awarded
the Bolzano Prize 2007 by the Rector of the Charles University; and although the
basic idea remains, it has been improved, concentrated, the propositions and conclu-
sions have been broadly revised, and the paper was naturally translated into English.
Chapter 3 examines the microeconomic motivation of governments to provide tax
incentives for foreign direct investment. The author applies the classical models of
oligopoly to subsidy competition, endogenousing investment incentives, but leaving
tax rates exogenous. According to the conventional wisdom, subsidy competition
leads to overprovision of incentives. This chapter suggests that, in the oligopolistic
framework, supranational coordination can either decrease or increase the supply of
subsidies. Further, in the setting of subsidy regulation, the host country’s corporate
income tax rate has an ambiguous eﬀect on the provision of incentives.
Chapter 4 presents a slightly modiﬁed version of a study that was published as
IES working paper 2009/07. In fact, it is the least independent one of all chapters
introduced in this thesis as it is more or less tight together with Chapter 3 through
empirical testing of theoretical models presented there.
The objective of Chapter 4 is to empirically assess the recently introduced models
of subsidy competition based on the classical oligopoly theories, using both cross-
sectional and panel data. Three crucial scenarios (including coordination, weak com-
petition, and ﬁerce competition) are tested employing OLS, iteratively re-weighted
least squares, ﬁxed eﬀects, and Blundell-Bond estimator. The results suggest that
none of the scenarios can be strongly supported—although there is some weak sup-
port for cooperation—, and hence that empirical evidence is not in accordance with
the tested models.
Chapter 2
Meta-Analysis of Intra-Industry FDI
Spillovers: Updated Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Governments all over the world pay fortunes, either in cash or as tax holidays, to
attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI) under their jurisdiction. There are
many reasons why governments attempt to lure multinational companies (MNCs) but
the principal one resides in their expectations of positive productivity externalities
spilling over from MNCs to domestic ﬁrms (see Blomstro¨m & Kokko 2003). There
has been a substantial body of empirical literature on productivity spillovers since
the 1970s, and many narrative literature reviews have been published (see, inter alia,
Pack & Saggi 1997). The ﬁrst quantitative survey, commonly called a meta-analysis,
was conducted by Go¨rg & Strobl (2001), followed by Meyer & Sinani (2005), and
Wooster & Diebel (2006). For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
narrative and quantitative methods of literature reviews, see Stanley (2001).
Meta-analysis is a rather new method in economics; it has been employed only
since the 1980s, and the meta-regression approach, which we particularly use in this
paper, was developed by Stanley & Jarrell (1989). The recent economic research
by means of meta-analysis covers for instance Gallet (2007) trying to uncover the
extent to which study characteristics inﬂuence the estimates of tuition and income
elasticities, Li et al. (2007) investigating systematic variation across environmental
Kuznets curve studies, Fidrmuc & Korhonen (2006) who present a study on business
cycle correlation between the Euro area and the Central-East European Economies,
or Rose & Stanley (2005) investigating the eﬀect of currency unions on international
trade.
A meta-analyst rigorously combines the outcomes of several works that study the
same phenomena. A meta-regression analyst, in the concrete, collects a number of
statistics from the targeted literature—e.g., correlation coeﬃcients or t statistics of
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estimates of the eﬀect in question—and regresses it on several proxies of the study
design. If any of meta-explanatory variables is found to be signiﬁcant, it is taken as an
evidence that studies’ results are dependent on their design (for a good introduction
to the meta-regression technique, see Stanley 2001). Concerning the meta-analyses of
the spillover literature, Go¨rg & Strobl (2001) apply plain ordinary least squares (OLS)
meta-regression, Meyer & Sinani (2005) employ panel data methods, and Wooster &
Diebel (2006) perform logistic meta-regression. We combine all the three methods
and include also robust estimations to get a more stable overall model. The sample
of literature used in this meta-analysis is also much broader than in the previous
ones, containing 67 original empirical works.
The present paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 lists channels of trans-
fers of intra-industry (or horizontal) spillovers from MNCs to domestic ﬁrms, and
describes the standard design of empirical works on horizontal spillovers. Section 2.3
discusses in detail the literature selection procedure which was employed, and de-
scribes properties of the resulting data set. Section 2.4 investigates the combined
signiﬁcance of the collected t statistics. In Section 2.5, the meta-regression analysis
is performed. Section 2.6 tests for the presence of publication bias in the spillover
literature. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Channels of Technology Transfer
The history of intra-industry productivity spillover literature1 dates from 1960, cov-
ering works of MacDougall, Corden or Caves, who analyzed the welfare eﬀects of FDI,
its impact on optimal tariﬀ policy, industrial level, and international trade openness.
A deeper speciﬁcation is provided in Blomstro¨m & Kokko (1996), embodied in the
three main channels of technology transfer:
Competition eﬀect As emphasized e.g. in Blomstro¨m (1992), the entrance of for-
eign enterprises contributes to the progression on industrial, technological and man-
agerial level and export dynamics through the creation of competitive environment.
Nevertheless, multinational companies may evoke crowding-out eﬀects as well as un-
fair competition, generating harmful externalities to the domestic ﬁrms. MNCs can
acquire signiﬁcant market shares or drain deﬁcient resources. Such unwanted eﬀects
are highlighted by several researchers (for instance, Haddad & Harrison 1993, who,
in fact, ﬁnd evidence of negative horizontal spillovers).
Demonstration eﬀect Its realization stems from the diﬀerences in technology be-
tween foreign investors and host-country ﬁrms. MNCs enter the host-country market
1Other FDI externalities than productivity spillovers have been discussed as well, in the concrete
the market access spillovers (see, e.g., Blomstro¨m & Kokko 2003) or ﬁnancing spillovers (Gersˇl &
Hlava´cˇek 2007; Gersˇl 2008), but there are only a few empirical studies estimating those.
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and establish aﬃliates which possess superior technology compared to local compa-
nies. The latter watch and imitate these aﬃliates in the same industry, thus becoming
more productive. Sometimes only a direct contact with new technologies can over-
come conservative attitudes toward the implementation of up-to-date technologies
(Blomstro¨m & Kokko 1996).
Labor turnover Host country’s citizens employed by the foreign investor might
beneﬁt from the contact with advanced technologies and production methods. Based
on the transfer of human capital, knowledge, and skills toward the host country labor
force, this labor exchange phenomena can enhance competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms.
MNCs train local labor force because it is still cheaper than import skilled labor
from their home country, even though, in most cases, they cannot prevent the labor
turnover (see Go¨rg & Greenaway 2004).
Since it is not possible the measure the above-mentioned eﬀects directly, empiri-
cal works on horizontal productivity spillovers are usually performed in the following
way: researchers collect data on ﬁrms’ productivity or output (either on ﬁrm or in-
dustry level) and regress it on a measure of foreign presence in the ﬁrms’ industries,
controlling also for additional variables (capital/output, labor/output ratios, etc.).
If the estimate of the parameter for foreign presence is found to be positive and sig-
niﬁcant, the authors conclude that there is some statistical evidence for the existence
of intra-industry spillovers.
2.3 The Sample of Literature
In the present paper, 97 results from 67 diﬀerent studies are used, which is a signif-
icant increase compared to Go¨rg & Strobl (2001), who used a sample of 21 studies,
or Meyer & Sinani (2005) and Wooster & Diebel (2006), who had at their disposal
41 and 32 studies, respectively. We tried to include all relevant papers listed in the
previous meta-analyses; additional search was performed in the EconLit and Google
Scholar databases using combinations of the keywords “foreign direct investment”,
“productivity spillovers”, and “technology transfer”.
We follow the approach of Go¨rg & Strobl (2001) in the selection process, i.e.,
only those studies are included which do not diverge signiﬁcantly from the standard
methodology of productivity-spillovers empirical work as it is described in Section 2.2,
and only English-written papers are considered. What does “diverge signiﬁcantly”
stand for? In the ﬁrst place, we do not use results for inter-industry (or vertical),
market access, and ﬁnancing spillovers. These categories are qualitatively relative,
but the tested speciﬁcations are, in our opinion, too dissimilar to be pooled together
in the framework of a meta-analysis, and it would be much more appropriate to
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analyze these streams of literature separately. The more distant models are used,
the more heterogeneous the sample becomes and the less reliable are the results drawn
from it. Random-eﬀects meta-analysis may provide a remedy for heterogeneity (see,
inter alia, Hedges 1992), but better approach may be to (try to) avoid the problem.
Excluding inter-industry, market access, and ﬁnancing spillovers, there is still a
substantial body of empirical literature dealing with horizontal productivity spillo-
vers. Many papers present multiple models, and thus multiple results. As a rule, we
tried to choose the one that was considered the best by the researchers themselves. If
the preferred model was not suitable for the analysis—i.e., it diverged too much from
the standard methodology—, the model with the highest R-squared (or adjusted R-
squared, depending on which one was published) was selected. There are also works
that examine diﬀerent countries with the same methodology, or one country with
diﬀerent speciﬁcations which are, nevertheless, consistent with the mainstream ap-
proach. For example, Konings (2000) studies spillovers in Bulgaria, Poland, and
Romania separately, thus 3 observations were included from his paper. Liu (2008)
ﬁrst presents a purely ﬁrm-level model but subsequently adds industry dummies,
thus we obtain two observations from this paper, etc. On the other hand, Sadik &
Bolbol (2001) apply not industry- or ﬁrm-, but country-level aggregation, and Zhu
& Tan (2000) uses city-level data set, therefore we do not include these papers—
although Wooster & Diebel (2006) use them. Rattsø & Stokke (2003) employ two
proxies for foreign presence at the same time, the share of trade on GDP and FDI on
overall investment, none of them belonging to the standard measures in the spillover
literature—thus this paper is also excluded from the meta-analysis.
We realize that the selection process is the most vulnerable part of the present
work, but the ﬁnal sample is broad and represents works of researchers from dozens
of countries and evidence from many economies around the world. Both journal
articles and working papers were used. The list of employed studies and some of their
characteristics can be found in Table 2.7 in the Appendix to Chapter 2: Section 2.A.
The ﬁrst aspect of the study design that we include in the meta-analysis is the
status of the country for which the data are used. From the whole sample of 97
observations, 41 models are using data for developing countries, 34 models’ data are
for transition countries, and 22 for advanced economies. Countries are distributed
in groups according to the European Economic Association (transition countries
list) and the World Bank (developing economies list). The second aspect is the
(non)existence of time dimension in the data. Thirty-two models use cross-sectional
data, the remaining 65 models rely on panel-data techniques. The third aspect is
the deﬁnition of MNCs’ presence. Thirty-two speciﬁcations deﬁne foreign presence
in the industry as foreign ﬁrms’ share on employment, 25 use assets, 21 output (or
value added), and 19 share on sales. The fourth aspect is the level of aggregation.
Forty models use purely ﬁrm-level data, whereas 35 include also industry dummies
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and 22 aggregate data on the level of industries. The ﬁfth aspect is the deﬁnition
of the response variable. Thirty-nine speciﬁcations use output growth, 54 models
apply labor (or total factor2) productivity level or log-level and the rest employ
other measures (for details of diﬀerent measures, see Go¨rg & Strobl 2001). Exact
deﬁnitions of all variables and their summary statistics can be found in Table 2.8 in
the Appendix to the present chapter.
2.4 Combined Signiﬁcance
Once we have collected a broad sample of empirical studies on intra-industry spillo-
vers, the most natural question appears to be: can we somehow decide whether or
not there is any general evidence for the existence of the spillover eﬀect? The crucial
result of every empirical work on productivity spillovers is the (non)signiﬁcance, po-
larity, and magnitude of the estimate of the regression parameter which corresponds
to the variable that is used as a proxy for foreign presence in the industry. Since
every researcher can (and generally does) use diﬀerent units, it is not appropriate to
take the magnitude of estimates as the representative variable. The t statistic, on the
other hand, is a dimension-less variable which is widely employed for the purposes
of a meta-analysis (it is also used by all three existing meta-analyses of the spillover
literature Go¨rg & Strobl 2001; Meyer & Sinani 2005; Wooster & Diebel 2006).
The ﬁrst possible way how to deliver the result is to employ the so-called “vote-
counting method” (see, inter alia, Hunter & Schmidt 1990). Following this approach,
one would count the median value of t statistics in the sample; let us denote it TM . If
the median value was signiﬁcant, this could be taken as an evidence for the existence
of the phenomenon in question, and vice versa. This method has been criticized, e.g.,
by Djankov & Murrell (2002). Instead of the vote-counting method, they examine
the following statistic:
T =
∑K
k=1tk√
K
, (2.1)
where K denotes the number of models included in the meta-analysis (i.e., K = 97
in our case) and tk is the t statistic taken from the k-th model. Provided that all
studies are independent and have suﬃciently large number of degrees of freedom, T
is normally distributed and combined signiﬁcance can be easily tested. Note that,
from this point of view, the vote-counting method drastically under-values the “real”
eﬀect. Indeed, many meta-analysts (e.g., Hedges & Olkin 1985) consider it to be
obsolete. Still, it is widely used especially in narrative literature reviews.
2To simplify, we abstract from the fact that there are diﬀerent ways how to estimate total factor
productivity, although it might also aﬀect the extent of detected spillovers.
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Djankov & Murrell (2002) also propose another modiﬁcation of (2.1):
TW =
∑K
k=1wktk√∑K
k=1w
2
k
, (2.2)
where wk are weights assigned to the k-th model, TW being normally distributed.
Both (2.1) and (2.2) are used in meta-analyses of the spillover literature. Meyer &
Sinani (2005) arbitrarily assign higher weights to the models that employ “sophisti-
cated econometric methods”, Wooster & Diebel (2006) simply use the inversion of
the number of models taken from a particular paper (for example, if 3 models from
the paper are taken, each has the weight 1/3). We deﬁne a combined weight which
accounts for (i) the number of models taken from a particular paper as in Wooster &
Diebel (2006), and (ii) the “quality” of the paper. Quality is proxied by the level of
publication, i.e., working papers have the lowest weight (w = 0.25), articles published
in lesser journals have moderate weight (w = 0.5), and articles published in the top
60 economics journals according to the list by Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) have the
full weight (w = 1). It would be possible to take more complicated weights, e.g.,
some distribution of impact factors, but then there would be a problem with weights
for working papers. Nevertheless, even such simple weights have signiﬁcant impact
on the results, as can be seen from Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 shows the combined signiﬁcance of the spillover eﬀect in diﬀerent groups
of the sample. Both normally distributed statistics T (2.1) and TW (2.2), and the
median value TM are reported. Values of tk from our sample vary signiﬁcantly, from
the lowest point of −11.58 to the peak of 27.7. Because such excessive values have
rather dramatic eﬀect on the combined signiﬁcance, we report also T , TW , and TM for
a narrower sample without these outliers. More concretely, we employ the restriction
|tk| ≤ 8, thus the narrower sample contains 87 observations. From these 6 measures of
combined signiﬁcance, we would prefer TW without outliers. It is evident at ﬁrst sight
that the weighted value (TW ) is in most cases below the simple measure T , indicating
that better-quality papers may report lower t statistics, or that discounting the
weights for multiple models taken from one paper has a powerful eﬀect. Nevertheless,
for the pooled sample both T and TW are highly signiﬁcant, even with the exclusion
of outliers. TM , on the other hand, is not signiﬁcant. To conclude, the spillover
eﬀect is, in general, not signiﬁcant according to the vote-counting method, but it is
signiﬁcant applying the Djankov & Murrell (2002) methodology.
There are two groups in the sample for which the spillover eﬀect is signiﬁcant,
independently of the methodology in use or spillovers exclusion—these are studies
using cross-sectional data and studies with industry-level aggregation. Speciﬁcations
that measure MNCs’ presence as a share of employment are together not signiﬁcant
only when the combined t statistic is measured by TM without outliers. On the
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other hand, for ﬁrm-level speciﬁcations, panel data models, studies using sales as
a measure of foreign presence, and papers published in the top 60 world economics
journals, combined t statistics are positively signiﬁcant only if they are measured
simply as T and outliers are included; the remaining 5 measures are insigniﬁcant or
even negatively signiﬁcant. Based on this ﬁnding, one could argue that there might
be a tendency in the most prestigious journals to publish rather skeptical empirical
studies on productivity spillovers, or—perhaps more probably—that papers of high
quality might be more likely to ﬁnd no or even negative spillover eﬀects. However, it
seems that the eﬀect of quality on the results is not linear, since studies published in
lesser journals are more likely to ﬁnd positive spillovers than studies published only
as working papers. This might suggest that it does matter how we deﬁne “the best
journals”. In spite of that, the present authors would argue that the trend among the
most respected journals is obvious and that minor changes in the deﬁnitions would
not change the conclusion.
It is also interesting that—for transition countries excluding outliers—all three
combined t statistics are insigniﬁcant and even negative. This can be surprising since
transition countries are usually considered to be likely to beneﬁt from FDI highly as,
in their case, the technology gap between domestic ﬁrms and MNCs is not too wide
(see, e.g., Blomstro¨m & Kokko 2003). Furthermore, it seems that newer studies
(those published after 2002, dividing the sample approximately to 2 halves) might
be more likely to report insigniﬁcant results, although the eﬀect of studies’ age does
not appear to be very strong.
2.5 Meta-Regression
We have already seen that various aspects of studies’ design are likely to inﬂuence
the result—which is the t statistic for the estimate of the coeﬃcient that represents
the measure of foreign presence in the industry. In this section, we would like to
investigate this pattern more thoroughly, using a diﬀerent and more advanced ap-
proach known as the meta-regression analysis. As a benchmark case, we follow Go¨rg
& Strobl (2001) who run a plain OLS regression:
Yk = α+
L∑
l=1
βlXkl + k, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (2.3)
where the meta-response variable Yk is the t statistic from the k-th speciﬁcation and
meta-explanatory variables Xkl reﬂect diﬀerent aspects of studies’ design according to
the 5 main features from Section 2.3—i.e., those that can be chosen by the researchers
ex ante.3 For this reason, we do not include a dummy for the level of publication.
3Base case: data are ﬁrm-level, panel, and for a developed country, response variable is speciﬁed
in productivity level, log-level, or “other”, foreign presence is measured in sales.
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Because in the absence of publication bias there should be a signiﬁcant and positive
relation between the number of degrees of freedom in the particular model and its
reported (absolute) value of t statistic, the logarithm of degrees of freedom makes an
additional meta-explanatory variable. Another aspect we would like to control for
is the time period for which the study was conducted, thus we include the average
year of study period as a meta-explanatory variable. The ﬁnal model consists of 11
meta-explanatory variables for 97 observations, which gives us much more degrees of
freedom than Go¨rg & Strobl (2001) have (25 observations for 9 regressors).
Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table 2.8 in Section 2.A. All compu-
tations were conducted in Stata 10; the dataset and source code are available on the
enclosed DVD (Appendix B) and the thesis website. First, we examine relationships
between meta-explanatory variables. The table of correlation coeﬃcients (Table 2.9)
is included in the Appendix to this chapter, as well—the highest absolute value of
all correlation coeﬃcients, 0.63, does not seem to indicate multicollinearity. The
condition number is high, but it is suﬃcient to exclude the average year of study
period and it declines to 16. In the regression model, exclusion of this variable does
not change the estimated signs neither the signiﬁcances of estimates, thus we mostly
work with the complete number of meta-explanatory variables. If we regress (in
turn) all meta-explanatory variables on the remaining meta-explanatory variables
and collect the coeﬃcients of determination of such regressions, we obtain the linear
redundancy statistics (see Table 2.2). The highest R-squared reaches 0.67, which is
not excessive.
Table 2.2: Linear and non-linear relationships
Variable Linear Polynomial
Logarithm of degrees of freedom 0.457 0.497
Average year of study period 0.322 0.389
Dummy = 1 if data are for developing country 0.532 0.618
Dummy = 1 if data are for transition country 0.665 0.755
Dummy = 1 if data are cross-section 0.455 0.487
Dummy = 1 if response variable is output growth 0.279 0.330
Dummy = 1 if data are industry-level 0.547 0.699
Dummy = 1 if industry dummies are used 0.308 0.355
Dummy = 1 if MNC presence measured in employment 0.656 0.687
Dummy = 1 if MNC presence measured in assets 0.548 0.570
Dummy = 1 if MNC presence measured in output 0.562 0.595
An important thing—which is, nevertheless, usually omitted—is to test also for
non-linear relationships between explanatory variables (Vı´ˇsek 1997, p. 71). Such
relationships cannot be discovered by standard correlation and redundancy analysis.
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Suppose for example that we obtain the following estimate of a regression model:
Ŷi = Xi1 + 2Xi2, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (2.4)
Assume also that there is a latent relationship which would give estimate X̂i2 =
1 − 10X4i1. If one obtains (2.4) and claims on the basis of it that Xi1 has positive
impact on Yi, it is obviously not correct. This issue is even more problematic for
studies which report polarities of some regression estimates as their key results—and
this is the case of empirical works on productivity spillovers. A way how to (try
to) discover such non-linear relationships is to use the Weierstrass Approximation
Theorem and estimate J following regressions:
Xim = α+
J∑
j=1
P∑
p=1
βjpX
p
ij + ϑi, i = 1, . . . , N, m = 1, . . . , J, m 6= j, (2.5)
where one must have JP < N to leave a suﬃcient number of degrees of freedom for
the regressions. We solved (2.5) with J = 11 and P = 6, the coeﬃcients of determi-
nation are listed in Table 2.2. The highest increase in R-squared compared to simple
linear redundancy was detected for variable INDUSTRY and reached 0.15, which is
not much taking into account that the new regression has 50 more explanatory vari-
ables. Therefore we have good hope that non-linear relationships do not represent a
substantial problem for our analysis.
Results of the standard meta-regression, using OLS, are reported in Table 2.10 in
Section 2.A. We found it necessary to exclude the most obscure observations—with
|tk| > 8. There are three main reasons for such selection. Firstly, observations with
such a high absolute value of t statistic reach also the largest values of Cook’s distance
for speciﬁcation 1 of Table 2.10 and their predicted residuals are high. Secondly, there
is a large gap between the observation with the absolute value of t statistic equal to
5.9 and the next higher one 8.4. Thirdly, it is a similar cut-oﬀ level as was used by
Go¨rg & Strobl (2001). Nevertheless, we report both types of speciﬁcations (with and
without outliers) in Table 2.10.
Performing standard tests of suitability of the model (referring to speciﬁcation 5
of Table 2.10), the Ramsey RESET test does not reject the null hypothesis, thus the
selected speciﬁcation is not considered to be inappropriate. Results of multicollinear-
ity analysis and analysis of non-linear relationships do not change when outliers are
excluded. To deal with a possible presence of heteroscedasticity of disturbances,
we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White
sandwich estimator, see Huber (1967) and White (1980). To test for normality of
disturbances, we employ the Shapiro-Wilk test, which rejects the null hypothesis.
Unfortunately, most of the meta-explanatory variables are dummies, which restricts
the possibilities for transformations, and executing Box-Cox transformations on the
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response variable does not bring any substantial improvement. This is one of the
reasons for which we decided to employ also other methods, not only plain OLS as
Go¨rg & Strobl (2001).
The most obvious choice is to use some of robust estimators, which can also help
to assess whether the selected cut-oﬀ level for outliers in OLS was the right one. We
decided for two alternative estimators, iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRLS)
with Huber and Tukey bisquare weight functions tuned for 95% Gaussian eﬃciency
(see Hamilton 2006, pp. 239–256) and median regression4 from the family of quantile
regressions. Results of the robust meta-regression can be found in Table 2.11 in the
Appendix to this chapter. Concerning the selection of outliers in OLS, we can see
that, e.g., IRLS predicts results that are very similar to that of OLS without outliers.
Therefore we can conclude that the cut-oﬀ |tk| ≤ 8 does not seem to be improperly
chosen.
Following Meyer & Sinani (2005), we also perform a pseudo-panel data meta-
regression. The cross-sectional dimension is represented by diﬀerent papers, the other
dimension is the order of a model taken from a particular paper. Because we have
97 observations from 67 papers at our disposal, it would not be wise to use the ﬁxed-
eﬀects model, as many observations would be dropped and the number of degrees
of freedom would diminish signiﬁcantly, thus it is not even possible to test for ﬁxed
eﬀects reliably. Therefore, we will assume that the study-speciﬁc eﬀect is normally
distributed (nevertheless, this kind of extreme unbalancedness might have an eﬀect
on the random eﬀects estimates as well). We will test the following unbalanced panel
data model:
Yij = αi +
L∑
l=1
βlXijl + ij , i = 1, 2, . . . , 67, j = 1, 2, . . . , 8. (2.6)
Results of random-eﬀects meta-regression are reported in Table 2.12 in Sec-
tion 2.A. It is apparent that, excluding outliers, there is no substantial diﬀerence in
the predictions of plain OLS and random-eﬀects regression. Testing for random ef-
fects, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test does not reject the null hypothesis
(it is signiﬁcant only at the 15% level), thus it might suﬃce to perform plain OLS
in this case. But there is one other advantage of the panel-data method: as Stanley
(2001) remarks, if a meta-analyst takes a lot of observations from one paper, a single
researcher (or even a single work) can dominate the whole meta-regression. This is
not the case of our study since the sample that we use is very diversiﬁed, but still,
panel-data methods might deliver more “balanced” results.
Another approach is to restrict the meta-response variable to a binary one and
employ the probit or logit models (for a related example, see Wooster & Diebel 2006).
Therefore, we construct a dummy variable which equals to one when t statistic is
4The algorithm minimizes the sum of the absolute deviations about the median.
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positive, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we construct a similar dummy for signiﬁ-
cance: if the absolute value of t statistic reaches the 5% critical value, the dummy
equals one, and zero otherwise. Both models are estimated with normal probabil-
ity regression and the results can be found in Table 2.13 in Section 2.A. Although
there are slight diﬀerences between the results of the probit model when the re-
sponse variable is dummy for positiveness (speciﬁcation 1 from Table 2.13) and our
benchmark-case OLS, basically it tells the same story in terms of signiﬁcances and
polarities of estimates.
When the dummy for signiﬁcance is used as the meta-response variable, the only
signiﬁcant meta-explanatory variables are number of degrees of freedom in the study,
average year of study period, and cross-sectionality of data. Our results suggest that
higher number of observations leads to more signiﬁcant results (either positive or
negative), which is something one would expect. Cross-sectional data bring more
signiﬁcant t-statistics. Moreover, the reported degree of signiﬁcance seems to be
declining over time—studies using newer data are more likely to ﬁnd insigniﬁcant
results.
The results of all methods of meta-regression are summarized in Table 2.3. We
do not prefer any speciﬁc model, and rather construct a “representative” one, taking
a simple arithmetic average of all t statistics reported by the meta-regressions (or z
statistics in the case of probit). Expression (2.1) is not used here because all spec-
iﬁcations from Table 2.3 use the same data. We argue that the resulting model (t
statistics are depicted in Figure 2.1) is much more stable than any of speciﬁcations
1–5 could be per se, and since all speciﬁcations seem to yield similar results, our
conclusions based on the representative model should be robust. There are three
meta-explanatory variables which are robustly signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Our re-
sults show that cross-sectional data, industry-level aggregation,5 and usage of share
in employment as a proxy for foreign presence brings, in general, more positively
signiﬁcant outcomes than other speciﬁcations. It does not seem to matter, on the
other hand, how the response variable is deﬁned.
The signiﬁcance of the cross-sectionality of data conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Go¨rg &
Strobl (2001), who claim that the bias could be caused by time invariant variables
which are not identiﬁed by the explanatory variables in cross-sectional spillover stud-
ies. Panel data methods can, on the other hand, uncover these eﬀects, and thus are
more reliable. Cross-sectional studies, especially in combination with industry-level
data, can thus cause the causality problem—foreign investors may seek eﬃcient and
more productive industries for their investments, thus researchers would report a
5Meyer & Sinani (2005) emphasize that industry-level studies obviously tend to have less degrees
of freedom than ﬁrm-level ones, while more observations appear to bring higher values of t statis-
tics. Indeed, even in our case the correlation coeﬃcient between INDUSTRY and LDF reaches
−0.6. Nevertheless, as can be seen, e.g., from Table 2.10 in the Appendix to the present chapter,
INDUSTRY stays positive and highly signiﬁcant even if we exclude LDF from the model, thus our
conclusion is not aﬀected.
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positive spillover eﬀect, even if the particular industry had had high productivity
long before MNCs entered it. On the other hand, Proenc¸a et al. (2006) argue that
the classical panel data methods of spillover estimation may generate downward bias
and they recommend using the extended generalized method of moments. From this
point of view, cross-sectional studies tend to over-value spillovers, whilst traditional
panel data studies could under-value them, thus the true eﬀect may lie somewhere
in between and there is little ground for general conclusions.
Contrary to Go¨rg & Strobl (2001), we also ﬁnd the level of aggregation and us-
age of share in employment as a proxy for foreign presence signiﬁcant. Concerning
the former, industry-level aggregation over heterogeneous ﬁrms may generally lead
to biased results (Go¨rg & Greenaway 2004), since it does not cope with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬀects that can be correlated with foreign presence. Concerning the latter, employ-
ment intensive foreign investments could generate larger spillovers through the labor
turnover channel, contrary to the sales intensive foreign investors who may, on the
other hand, be more involved in the competition eﬀect which has ambiguous impacts
on host-country ﬁrms (Meyer & Sinani 2005). This could explain the signiﬁcant co-
eﬃcient that was obtained for the variable EMPL and might suggest that using a
share of employment as a proxy for foreign presence is not misspeciﬁcation; however,
the deﬁnition of proxy for foreign presence deserves attention. Researchers should al-
ways check their outcomes on various deﬁnitions of proxies and try to explain possible
diﬀerent outcomes.6
It is also evident that the dominant speciﬁcation of spillovers’ testing has been
changing over time. Since the ﬁrst researchers followed the pioneering work of Caves
(1974) and used cross-sectional data and industry-level aggregation, a little had
changed before Haddad & Harrison (1993) published their study on Morocco, where
they—using ﬁrm-level panel data—found evidence of negative horizontal spillovers
due to the competition eﬀect. Nevertheless, not many researchers used panel data
again till 1999, where the other highly inﬂuential work (Aitken & Harrison 1999)
was published. After that, panel-data and ﬁrm-level analysis has become more fre-
quent and has been almost unambiguously dominating the literature since 2003,
leaving cross-sectional and industry-level methods mostly for countries where de-
tailed data are not easily accessible, e.g., China. Because our results suggest that
the (non)presence of time dimension in the data is one of the crucial aspects of the
study design, we decide to split the sample into two halves (studies published before
2003, and vice versa), and employ the Chow test to check whether it was appropriate
to pool the data together in the ﬁrst place. The Chow test is signiﬁcant only at the
6There is a general problem connected with deﬁning “foreign presence”. As Castellani & Zanfei
(2007) show, the common approach can cause downward bias in spillover estimates, since it assumes
that changes of the same proportion in aggregate and foreign activities within an industry do not
aﬀect the response variable, whilst the contrary can be the case in reality.
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23% value, thus the data were probably pooled correctly. Still, it might be beneﬁtial
to estimate the model separately for the two time periods.
The results of meta-regressions for older studies are reported in Table 2.4, more
detailed speciﬁcations and regressions also with outliers can be found in Appendix A.
In the case of probit, the dummy for industry-level data had to be omitted since
otherwise the probit model would not have converged.7 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier test is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, thus one might put more weight on
random-eﬀects model rather than on plain OLS. Similarly as for the pooled sample
of all studies, it seems to matter whether data are cross-sectional, aggregated on the
industry level, and whether the share of foreign presence is measured in employment.
Contrary to the pooled sample, however, also the fact whether data for transition
countries are used and whether foreign presence is measured as share in output are
signiﬁcant. In the older studies, ﬁrms in transition countries are more likely to beneﬁt
from horizontal FDI spillovers.
Results for newer studies can be found in Table 2.5, detailed estimates of each
type of a meta-regression are available in Appendix A. In the case of probit, one
dummy (developing country) had to be dropped so as for the model to converge. The
Breusch-Pagan test is not signiﬁcant at any reasonable level, thus we put more weight
on plain OLS. Estimated dependencies are much less apparent now than for the older
studies. It is again important whether data are cross-sectional and what the level
of aggregation is, but no other meta-explanatory variable is signiﬁcant in more than
only one speciﬁcation of Table 2.5. Thus it appears that the pattern, having basically
still the same shape, is getting weaker over time. This would suggest that, at least
recently, researchers have been aware of this dependency of results on the study design
and have begun to employ more balanced approaches, maybe even to compensate
for the “expected” results. Indeed, the empirical literature has been diverging a lot
since the work of Go¨rg & Strobl (2001) was published. A signiﬁcant number of
new studies test both for intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, authors check
multiple methodologies and compare the results. Nevertheless, there are still simple
cross-sectional and/or industry-level studies, results of which can mostly be easily
predicted ex ante.
2.6 Test of Publication Bias
Stanley (2001) highlights the“ﬁle drawer”problem that occurs when researchers tend
to publish only or mostly the studies that are able to demonstrate signiﬁcant results,
because these are more likely to be accepted for publication in academic journals. It
has been shown, e.g., by Card & Krueger (1995) that the “ﬁle drawer” problem can
7It does not mean, though, that INDUSTRY would be insigniﬁcant. Conversely, it predicts a
perfect ﬁt—industry-level aggregation always brings positive values of t statistics for spillovers in
older studies.
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be extremely signiﬁcant in economic publishing. In the concrete, for the literature on
minimum wages and employment they ﬁnd vast evidence of a publication bias. The
same phenomena was detected by Go¨rg & Strobl (2001) in the spillover literature
and both subsequent meta-analyses (Meyer & Sinani 2005; Wooster & Diebel 2006)
also report similar results.
We employ the same test as was advocated by Card & Krueger (1995) and also
performed by Go¨rg & Strobl (2001). The set-up is illustrated in (2.7)—we regress
the absolute value of t statistics reported by the k-th model on the natural logarithm
of the square root of number of observations in the k-th model, controlling also for
all other meta-explanatory variables which were included in model (2.3):
|tk| = α+ β log(
√
Mk) +
L−1∑
l=1
γlXkl + k, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (2.7)
where Mk is the number of observations in the k-th model. The crucial point of this
test is the (non)signiﬁcance and magnitude of the estimated parameter β. Under the
null hypothesis of no publication bias, it should hold that β = 1. In other words,
logarithm of square root of number of observations should increase the ﬁnal model’s
t statistic for foreign presence proportionally angle-wise 45 degrees.
Results of the publication bias test are reported in Table 2.6. Speciﬁcations 1–4
show plain OLS regression with all observations, speciﬁcations 5–8 exclude outliers.
The cut-oﬀ level for outliers is still the same (|tk| ≤ 8). It is a good sign that, under
any speciﬁcation, the estimate of β is signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level and it is
positive, which suggests that more degrees of freedom, ceteris paribus, increase the
results’ level of signiﬁcance as it should be the case of unbiased literature.
Estimated values of β are very close to 1 for all speciﬁcations counted including
large values of |tk|. Testing the hypothesis β = 1 with a simple t test, we conclude
that there is no sign of publication bias (the corresponding test statistics are available
in Table 2.6, as well). The picture, however, changes signiﬁcantly when we exclude
observations with |tk| > 8. Through all speciﬁcations 5–8, the estimated value of β
is far from 1 and all conducted t tests result in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis
powerfully.
What conclusions should one draw from such irresolute numbers? The present
authors would argue that the exclusion of outliers is not entirely appropriate in this
case. Model (2.7) which we test now is diﬀerent from (2.1), on the basis of which
the cut-oﬀ level for outliers was actually determined. The regression model without
spillovers is characterised by higher R-squared, but the levels of signiﬁcance of meta-
explanatory variables are rather worse there. Moreover, such large values of |tk| can
be very important in this regression since they can support or weaken the hypothesis
very powerfully, as is in fact shown. All things considered, it seems more suitable to
prefer the results of speciﬁcations 1–4, i.e., with all observations including “outliers”.
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While all older meta-analyses reject the null hypothesis of no bias powerfully, we
conclude that the evidence of publication bias has almost vanished from the spillover
literature, and therefore it is becoming more reliable. Nevertheless, the result is quite
vulnerable on regression speciﬁcation, and exclusion of only a few observations could
twist the outcome.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on horizontal produc-
tivity spillovers from FDI. We gather a sample of 97 models from 67 studies published
either in academic journals or as working papers. Using the vote-counting method,
the spillover eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in general; employing the approach of Djankov
& Murrell (2002), on the other hand, there is some evidence that positive spillovers
from FDI might exist. Nevertheless, it is not the case of the narrower sample of stud-
ies that were published in the best economics journals—their combined t statistic
is insigniﬁcant almost in any case. Therefore, the present authors argue that there
is no general persuasive empirical evidence on the intra-industry spillovers. If there
are any horizontal spillover eﬀects, their signs and magnitudes vary from country to
country and from industry to industry.
We also investigate which study aspects aﬀect the reported signiﬁcance and po-
larity of spillovers, using a meta-regression analysis which was elaborated by Stanley
& Jarrell (1989). Nevertheless, we use not only the standard ordinary least squares
meta-regression (like Go¨rg & Strobl 2001) but we also employ robust methods (it-
eratively re-weighted least squares and median regression) as well as pseudo-panel
data methods (Meyer & Sinani 2005) and probability models (Wooster & Diebel
2006). We ﬁnd that, in general, study results are aﬀected by its design, namely by
usage of cross-sectional or panel data, industry- or ﬁrm-level aggregation, and spec-
iﬁcation of the proxy of foreign presence in the industry. Our results suggest that
cross-sectional studies tend to report excessively high spillovers, as well as models
with industry-level aggregation and employment as a proxy for foreign presence do.
However, this pattern appears to become weaker over time, suggesting that newer
studies may suﬀer from such a bias less.
Following Card & Krueger (1995), we test for publication bias in the spillover
literature. Contrary to Go¨rg & Strobl (2001), we do not ﬁnd evidence of publication
bias in the whole sample, suggesting that the bias might have almost vanished from
the spillover literature. Nevertheless, our result is quite sensitive to the process
of literature selection since exclusion of only a few papers can twist the outcome
instantly.
Future research should concentrate on the inter-industry spillovers since they
seem to be more promising, the number of empirical works in this ﬁeld is growing
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and will soon be suﬃcient for a meta-regression analysis. Intra-industry productivity
spillovers, on the other hand, appear to stay nonexistent or undetectable, at least
in the standard research framework following Caves (1974) and Haddad & Harrison
(1993).
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Chapter 3
On the Determinants of Foreign
Direct Investment Incentives
3.1 Introduction
In the last decades, a rivalry for foreign direct investment (FDI) has been catching the
attention of economists increasingly. With loosing restraints to international trade
and investment since the early 1980s, competition for FDI has been progressively
escalating; and thus the question of foreign direct investment incentives (INIs) is
getting on urgency. In an eﬀort to obtain FDI under their legislation, governments
oﬀer extensive support at all levels, capable of granting hundreds of thousands USD
per one generated working station.1 Sympathizers of INIs maintain that worldwide
subsidy competition is a game with a positive outcome—positive externalities linked
to FDI are being internalized and the total allocation of investments is said to be
more eﬃcient than without INIs. But the majority of economists is rather skeptical
toward subsidy competition. They claim that the increase in allocation eﬃciency is
nowise guaranteed; INIs can per contra bring extensive distortions to various markets,
and globally a race to the bottom in the form of constantly lower tax revenues and
loosening of ecological standards—or impeding socially eﬃcient tightening of these
standards, which would follow otherwise—much like a threat to employees’ rights.2
As all available meta-analyses (Go¨rg & Strobl 2001; Meyer & Sinani 2005; Wooster
& Diebel 2006; Havra´nek & Irsˇova´ 2008) illustrate, there is no persuasive empirical
evidence of technological and knowledge diﬀusion, which—in the form of productivity
spillovers—presents the most important theoretical background for the provision of
INIs. This holds especially for intra-industry spillovers, while an elaborate empirical
analysis of inter-industry spillovers is only at its beginnings. Until a satisfactory
1See, e.g., Brazil incentives for Renault and Mercedes in the 1990s (da Motta Veiga & Iglesias
1998, pg. 59).
2Oman (2000, pg. 20) compares the process to the wave of devaluations and protectionism of the
1930s; issue has a character of the prisoner’s dilemma.
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resolution of this problem will be given, one can hardly draw any relevant conclusions
about the eﬃciency of INIs.
Which aspects aﬀect an oﬀered INI volume the most? To what degree is the
international subsidy competition intense? To help with the discussion of such prob-
lems, we will present two supply-of-investment-incentives models; the ﬁrst one for
the minimal suﬃcient INI, the other one for the optimal INI; and we will attempt to
integrate them into a more general model.
Most of theoretical works call for some form of global coordination of INIs (see,
inter alia, UNCTAD 1996), hoping that such agreement would decrease the provision
of INIs—thus implicitly assuming that free subsidy competition leads to overprovision
of FDI incentives. To our knowledge, the ﬁrst formalized model which shows that
this need not be the case is Hauﬂer & Wooton (2006). In the present paper, we
support their claim, using a very diﬀerent, regime-competition model.3 It is also
shown that higher corporate income tax (CIT) rate does not necessarily increase the
optimal subsidy levels, as could be intuitively expected.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a survey of related liter-
ature; the Minimal Suﬃcient INI Model (a targeted-competition model) is going to
be proposed. Section 3.3 introduces the Optimal INI Model (a regime-competition
model) and lists a few modiﬁcations. Section 3.4 concludes the paper.
3.2 The Minimal Suﬃcient INI Model
3.2.1 Related Work
There has been a substantial body of literature concerning with formalized modeling
of the provision of INIs. Absolute majority of models varies in assumptions rather
than in methodology—diﬀerent premises mean diﬀerent deﬁnitions of corresponding
public utility functions. From our perspective, the key precondition is the presence of
positive externalities from FDI, i.e. productivity spillovers, because this presumption
oﬀers a fundamental line of reasoning for the very existence of subsidy systems. Let
us outline the most relevant works:
Haaparanta (1996) postulates that countries maximize wage income of their cit-
izens resulting from working for foreign investors. Incentive schemes upset optimal
investment allocation—in the equilibrium, even countries with relatively high wages
can attract investments, although all countries grant optimal INIs from their point
of view. Therefore, in comparison to the situation when no one granted subsidies,
countries with lower competitiveness can augment the volume of attracted FDI.
In Haaland & Wooton (1999), the entry of a multinational company (MNC) to
the local market increases demand for intermediate products made in the host coun-
3For an excellent discussion of diﬀerent types of competition, see OECD (2003).
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try, which leads to other companies’ entry to the imperfect competition market of
intermediates. Improved competing background motivates other foreign investors to
enter the country, thereby multiplicatively raises national income and social welfare.
Governments are aware of these eﬀects—thus they grant INIs in an eﬀort to compete
with other countries, awaiting the same beneﬁts.
Barros & Cabral (2000) study competition between a smaller country with high
unemployment rate and a larger country without this problem. They assume that
there are no such ﬁrms capable of competing with the MNC. In the absence of
subsidies, the country with larger domestic market is more attractive but has less
motivation to lure the investment. Subsequently, a rivalry by means of incentives
could end in locating the investment into the smaller country. The authors argue
that incentives can increase total welfare—the smaller country needs the investment
more and has a higher beneﬁt from attracting it.
Pennings (2001) presents a two-agent model of a country and a foreign monop-
olistic producer. The company can choose whether to export its products into the
country or to undergo a horizontal FDI. In conclusion, for a country which maxi-
mizes public utility, an optimal strategy is to compensate investor’s expenses fully by
incentives and subsequently by taxes to reduce income which exceeds his alternative
proﬁt from importing into the country.
Hauﬂer & Wooton (2006) decompose competition between two countries facing
the third one simultaneously. They are the ﬁrst to show that in comparison to “free
subsidy competition”, coordinated policy of two countries could bring a decrease as
well as an increase of oﬀered INIs.
Bjorvatn & Eckel (2006) analyze FDI competition between asymmetric countries,
diﬀering both in market size and structure. They consider a presence of domestic
ﬁrms and show that competition tends to be strong especially when both countries
are similar in terms of business conditions. In such cases, countries can provide really
signiﬁcant INIs, and vice versa.
Ma (2007) supposes that inﬂow of FDI has certain redistribution eﬀects in the
domestic economy. He investigates the inﬂuence of interest groups on the competition
intensity between competing countries. Due to this tension, the winner can be also
the country that would not otherwise have a chance to succeed; and the costs of
attracting FDI increase for both countries.
Although we got inspired by the aforementioned models, we shall use a diﬀerent
methodology. Our intention is to demonstrate which inﬂuences are the most powerful
toward the amount of INIs provision—we are interested in their determinants, not in
the eﬃciency of provision. Let us start from the model of Hauﬂer & Wooton (1999)
and its later application by Sedmihradsky´ (2002).4 Firstly, we adjust their model for
its consecutive application for the expression of minimal sustainable tax relief.
4It is worth mentioning that none of these models directly deals with INIs.
3. On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives 45
3.2.2 Methodology and Basic Assumptions
Deﬁnition 3.1. Minimal sustainable tax relief of country i or critical rate of tax relief
of country i means the smallest feasible incentive of country i which makes an investor
indiﬀerent between the alternatives of countries i and j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}).
Assumption 3.1. Assume two countries of diﬀerent size that vary except GDP also
in the level of wage costs and corporate income tax (CIT) rate. Think of an MNC
producing a sole product. The company faces descending demand curve—to simplify,
it is a global monopoly. Let individual demand functions be in the form:
d(q) = a− q
b
,
where q is price and a, b are respective parameters of the demand.
Assumption 3.2. Investor’s home country does not tax its residents’ foreign-earned
incomes. Furthermore, there is no transfer pricing within the MNC.
The investor considers investing into a production capacity. Since we do not
consider any other markets, the company can choose ideally from these possibilities:
(i) to invest in Country 1 and export part of its production to Country 2, (ii) to
invest in Country 2 and import into Country 1, (iii) to invest in both countries, or
(iv) not to invest at all. If we presume the existence of transaction costs of goods
transportation from Country 1 to Country 2 and vice versa (e.g., expenses connected
with transport, distribution, marketing, market research, etc.), investor may select
the third option.
Assumption 3.3. Assume prohibitively high ﬁxed costs with respect to the third pos-
sibility. Suppose also that the company’s hypothetical proﬁt would be positive in
both countries.
May Country 2 have number of inhabitants equal to m. Suppose that Country
1 has n-times higher GDP than Country 2. Using this proportion as a weight, let
us postulate that individual demands in both countries are symmetric.5 Demand
functions in both countries can be formulated in the following way, all parameters
being positive:
D1(q) =
m · n(a− q)
b
(3.1)
for Country 1 and similarly
D2(q) =
m(a− q)
b
(3.2)
5It may seem more natural to use a proportion of the number of inhabitants for aggregation. In
our opinion, GDP recalculated according to purchasing power parity gives a better picture of the
market size. Such a deﬁnition of a weight can partially remove the restriction following from the
assumption of symmetrical demand functions in both countries.
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for Country 2.
Our thought, following Hauﬂer & Wooton (1999), is based on comparison of gains
of the company in dependence on its choice of the country. May the company decide
for an investment into Country 1. Then it will produce in Country 1 and export part
of this production to Country 2. In Country 1, the company sells its products for
the optimal price p1. However, in consequence of the existence of transaction costs,
in the second country’s market the demand price is raised by t, while the MNC still
obtains p1.
Let qi be the ﬁnal demand price of goods in country i. Assume a linear production
function with the only variable factor—labor. For Country 1 suppose that the wage
costs are k-times higher than in Country 2:
w1 = kw2. (3.3)
Assumption 3.4 (Similarity). Investment risk is the same for both countries and there
is no further relevant diﬀerence between the countries than is expressed by the CIT
rate (τi) and parameters n and k.
3.2.3 Optimization
Because the only production factor is wage costs, we can directly write down an
MNC’s proﬁt function for the ﬁrst country:
pi1 = (p1 − w1) [D1(q1) +D2(q2)] . (3.4)
Substituting (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.4) and rearranging, we obtain
pi1 =
m(p1 − kw2)
b
[(a− p1)(n+ 1)− t] .
The condition of the ﬁrst order is
∂pi1
∂p1
= m(n+ 1)
b
(
a− 2p1 + kw2 − t
n+ 1
)
= 0. (3.5)
Formulating price p1 from (3.5), we get
p1 =
1
2
(
a+ kw2 − t
n+ 1
)
.
The maximum can be veriﬁed by the condition of the second order:
∂2pi1
∂p21
[1
2
(
a+ kw2 − t
n+ 1
)]
= −2m(n+ 1)
b
.
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Substituting the optimal price into the proﬁt function yields
pi1 =
m [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2
4b(n+ 1) . (3.6)
In the same manner it is necessary to derive the formula for the second country.
Let us proceed analogically to get
pi2 =
m [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2
4b(n+ 1) . (3.7)
Until this moment we followed the approach of Hauﬂer & Wooton (1999) and
Sedmihradsky´ (2002), only several smaller modiﬁcations have been made. The con-
tinuation varies.
Let us deﬁne the net present value of investment in Country 1 as
NPV1 =
Y1∑
i=1
pi1
(1 + r)i +
M∑
j=Y1+1
pi1(1− τ1)
(1 + r)j − F , (3.8)
where Y1 denotes the duration of investor’s total tax relief granted by Country 1.
Assumption 3.5. There is no other form of INIs except the total CIT relief.6
Let M denote investment’s lifetime, F investment volume, τ1 statutory CIT rate,
and r discount rate. No inﬂation is considered. All parameters are positive and
τ1 ∈ (0, 1).
We shall formulate the model in discrete time. In period 0, the company does
not generate any proﬁt, but expends ﬁxed costs F . Then there is a constant ﬂow of
proﬁts in periods 1 to M . In periods 1 to Y1, the company exercises INIs. From year
Y1 + 1 till the end of investment’s lifetime, the proﬁt of the company is taxed by the
usual CIT rate of Country 1. Discount rate is constant throughout the investment’s
lifetime and is the same for both countries. Substituting (3.6) into (3.8) yields
NPV1 =
Y1∑
i=1
m [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)i
+
M∑
j=Y1+1
m [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 (1− τ1)
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)j − F .
6With regard to this assumption let us use the terms “total tax relief”, “tax allowances”, “tax
holidays” and “INIs” as synonyms on the following pages.
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The similar stands for Country 2:
NPV2 =
Y2∑
i=1
m [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)i
+
M∑
j=Y2+1
m [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 (1− τ2)
4b(n+ 1)(1 + r)j − F .
If proﬁt parity is valid for both countries, that means if investor is indiﬀerent when
deciding to which country to place his investment, the following must stand:
Y1∑
i=1
[(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2
(1 + r)i +
M∑
j=Y1+1
[(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 (1− τ1)
(1 + r)j =
=
Y2∑
i=1
[(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2
(1 + r)i +
M∑
j=Y2+1
[(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 (1− τ2)
(1 + r)j .
Consequently, neither the number of inhabitants of Country 2 nor ﬁxed investment
costs will have any inﬂuence on the result. We facilitate the situation by installing
zero discount rate for further steps.7 Thus we can write
Y1 [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 + (M − Y1)(1− τ1) [(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t]2 =
= Y2 [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 + (M − Y2)(1− τ2) [(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt]2 .
After rearrangements and extraction of Y1, we get
Y1 =
[(n+ 1)(a− w2)− nt
(n+ 1)(a− kw2)− t
]2 M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2
τ1
− M(1− τ1)
τ1
. (3.9)
Due to (3.6) and (3.7), (3.9) can be also written as
Y1 =
pi2
pi1
[M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2]−M(1− τ1)
τ1
. (3.10)
3.2.4 Comparative Statics
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let us deﬁne the relative quality of entrepreneurial environment in
country i as the ratio pii/pij . If this is more than 1, the environment in country i is
better than in country j.
Proposition 3.1. Minimal sustainable tax beneﬁt of country i is ceteris paribus de-
scending in the quality level of the entrepreneurial environment in i.
7Counting with nonzero discount rate does not bring any additional value added regarding the
key results of the model; and it can be shown that there exists no closed-form solution in such a
case. Moreover, since there is a constant ﬂow of proﬁts, we ﬁnd this simpliﬁcation even consistent.
One could equivalently suppose that the ﬂow of proﬁts is rising each year by such a coeﬃcient that
would compensate the fact of future proﬁts being discounted. Ad libitum.
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Proof. First, let us diﬀerentiate (3.10):
∂Y1
∂
(
pi1
pi2
) = −
(
pi1
pi2
)−2
[M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2]
τ1
.
For τ2 ∈ (0, 1), the expression M(1−τ2)+Y2τ2 is always nonnegative, as the duration
of tax holidays cannot exceed investment’s lifetime. Thus, the numerator is negative
as well as the whole derivative.
Proposition 3.2. Minimal sustainable incentive level in country i is increasing in the
relative price of its labor power.
Proof. Realizing that k negatively inﬂuences the proﬁt of the company in Country
1, but does not aﬀect its proﬁt in Country 2, pi2/pi1 increases and the attractiveness
of Country 1’s entrepreneurial environment decreases. Following Proposition 3.1, the
critical subsidy level in Country 1 must increase.
Proposition 3.3 (Strong competition). Minimal sustainable INI in country i is increas-
ing in CIT of country i, if relative entrepreneurial environment in country i is better
than in country j.
Proof. Examining an inﬂuence of the CIT rate on the critical beneﬁt period, let us
diﬀerentiate:
∂Y1
∂τ1
=
M − pi2pi1 [M(1− τ2) + Y2τ2]
τ21
. (3.11)
Because M(1 − τ2) + Y2τ2 is always less or equal to M and since the ratio pi2/pi1
is less than 1, numerator in (3.11) will be positive. Note that if the last condition
does not stand, nothing about the sign of the derivation can be said. Thus it is
possible that Y1 need not be increasing in τ1; for instance, if Country 2 is much
larger, richer or notably cheaper in terms of labor costs, and τ2 is simultaneously
close to zero (or, analogically, Y2 → M). But such counter-intuitive result requires
drastic assumptions, therefore we do not consider it to be a representative feature of
this model.
Proposition 3.4 (Regime competition). Minimal sustainable incentive level in country
i is increasing in the subsidy range of country j.
Proof. Dependence of the critical incentive level in country i on the stimuli duration
of country j is very simple:
∂Y1
∂Y2
= pi2τ2
pi1τ1
.
The result is evident due to Assumption 3.3 and positive τi.
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Instead of diﬀerentiating (3.10) with respect to all variables, it is more convenient
to demonstrate model functioning on a simple example (which is provided in an
Excel ﬁle on the enclosed DVD and also on the thesis website). Let us choose initial
parameters (row 1 in Table 3.1) and calibrate the model, followed by the discussion
of relatively more relevant parameters.
Example 3.1. Presumed investment’s lifetime is 20 years. Let a, the parameter of
investors’ demand, be 100. Workload needed to produce a unit of commodity is
$10 for Country 2, $12 for Country 1. Country 1 has twice as large market as its
rival. Transportation of goods to the other country means additional costs of $10.
CIT rate is 30% in both countries; Country 2 provides tax holidays to each foreign
investment for 10 years, automatically. The competitor decides ad hoc, individually
for each investor. The question is, how rich incentives Country 1 has to grant to
make investors indiﬀerent between the two countries.
Table 3.1: Sensibility of the Minimal Suﬃcient INI Model
Line no. Y1 Y2 τ1 τ2 a n k M t
1 8.23 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
2 13.07 15 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
3 3.39 5 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
4 11.17 10 0.4 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
5 2.34 10 0.2 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 10
6 5.00 10 0.3 0.4 100 2 1.2 20 10
7 11.46 10 0.3 0.2 100 2 1.2 20 10
8 9.85 10 0.3 0.3 1 2 1.2 20 10
9 5.72 10 0.3 0.3 50 2 1.2 20 10
10 4.04 10 0.3 0.3 100 5 1.2 20 10
11 12.76 10 0.3 0.3 100 1 1.2 20 10
12 12.34 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.5 20 10
13 3.39 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 0.8 20 10
14 7.86 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 25 10
15 8.96 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 10 10
16 3.68 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 20
17 10.44 10 0.3 0.3 100 2 1.2 20 5
Source: author’s computations on the basis of result (3.10).
First column of the ﬁrst row of Table 3.1 shows the situation from Example 3.1,
where tax exemption of 8.2 years suﬃces. What happens if Country 2 changes its
strategy? Apparently, increases in the duration of tax holidays in Country 2 force
the ﬁrst country to raise its incentive almost proportionally. This results already
from Proposition 3.4.
In accordance with Proposition 3.3, raising CIT in Country 1 by one third increases
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the minimal suﬃcient INI by 3 years, and vice versa. Changes in CIT of the rival
country will have an antagonistic eﬀect. Rising CIT of Country 2 to 40% results in
a decrease of the critical period of tax relief to 5 years; on the other hand, a shift to
20% will lead to an increase of subsidy to 11.5 years.
It is obvious that multiple changes in parameter a may inﬂuence incentives only a
little. The next two lines show an impact of changes in relative economic power—the
stronger purchasing power Country 1 has, the smaller amount of INIs the country
has to provide. In lines 12 and 13 changes in relative wage costs are itemized. The
growth in costs of Country 1 (represented by the rise of k from 1.2 to 1.5) means an
escalation in minimal suﬃcient incentive to 12.3 years—wage costs have a noticeable
impact on the critical length of subsidy, in line with Proposition 3.2. Conversely, a
change in investment’s lifetime M will not inﬂuence critical length of subsidy very
much for such selected parameters’ values.
Proposition 3.5 (Investment’s lifetime neutrality). If both countries have the same CIT
and quality of entrepreneurial environment, the investment’s lifetime does not aﬀect
the critical rate of INI.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (3.10) with respect to M yields:
∂Y1
∂M
=
pi2
pi1
(1− τ2)− (1− τ1)
τ1
.
Employing both assumptions, the result is evident.
Simultaneously, if Country 1 has better entrepreneurial environment than Coun-
try 2 but higher CIT, the critical rate of incentive will grow in M . In this case,
competing with a more populous, poorer country with lower CIT rate (say, the Czech
Republic vs. Poland), a relatively smaller and richer country with higher CIT has
to oﬀer noticeably higher incentives for long-term investments. This fact is overesti-
mated because of the condition of zero discount rate (in comparative statics, inﬂuence
of M is the only aspect strongly aﬀected by this condition). Finally, if transaction
costs are relatively high (line 16), the market of the larger country (Country 1) is
worse accessible and the company will rather decide to invest directly there. Minimal
sustainable incentive for this country decreases relatively fast.
3.2.5 Application on the Visegrad Countries
Deﬁnition 3.3. The term incentive parity signiﬁes a situation, when potential NPV of
the investment is the same for both countries.
In Table 3.2, all essential parameters are summarized for all four countries of
Visegrad group as of 2007. They were chosen on purpose; these countries are com-
petitors to large extent and there are no drastic divergences in economic performance
3. On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives 52
and institutional system, so that they largely satisfy the assumption of similarity (As-
sumption 3.4).
Table 3.2: Chosen indicators for surveyed countries
2007 Czech Rep. Slovakia Poland Hungary
GDP 250,057 109,672 621,984 191,453
W 1,208 710 1,166 900
CIT 24% 19% 19% 16%
Y 10 10 F/2 8
Note: GDP—value in millions of USD according to PPP.
W—wage costs in USD per month, calculated using the exchange rate at the end of the year.
Poland does not have any time limit of tax relief utilization, but (in most of the country)
it allows to use allowances up to one half of initial investment—it takes an advantage of
eﬀective European legislation. Since it is a higher allowance than in the Czech Republic, let
us approximate it to, for instance, 12 years (a rather conservative estimation).
Hungary provides 80% CIT reliefs for up to 10 years, which is approximated to 8 years of
total tax relief.
Source: IMF (2008), FEE (2008), EC (2008), www.czechinvest.cz, www.sario.sk, www.paiz.gov.pl,
www.itd.hu.
On the basis of line 1 from Table 3.2, let us calculate n, i.e. population purchasing
power ratio, while from the second row we ascertain k for all countries regarding the
Czech Republic (CR). The question is how rich incentive the CR has to oﬀer to keep
the investor indiﬀerent.
Table 3.3: Results of critical tax-relief period rate for the Czech Re-
public
Case Y1 Y2 τ1 τ2 a n k w2 M t
CR—Slovakia 11.0 10 0.24 0.19 1,000 2.28 1.70 5 15 10
CR—Poland 13.2 12 0.24 0.19 1,000 0.40 1.04 5 15 10
CR—Hungary 10.4 8 0.24 0.16 1,000 1.31 1.34 5 15 10
CR—Slovakia 8.6 10 0.15 0.19 1,000 2.28 1.70 5 15 10
CR—Poland 12.1 12 0.15 0.19 1,000 0.40 1.04 5 15 10
CR—Hungary 7.6 8 0.15 0.16 1,000 1.31 1.34 5 15 10
Source: author’s computations from Table 3.2 and result (3.10).
In the ﬁrst part of Table 3.3, let us examine the case of 24% CIT rate in the Czech
Republic, as of 2007. In the second part, we try to analyze how the result would
change if the Czech CIT rate decreased to, say, 15%. As we see, in the ﬁrst case (the
default situation), INIs were set broadly at par to Slovakia and Hungary—the model
results give 11.0 and 10.4 respectively, not far from the actual real value (10 years).
However, Poland had the parity much higher—at 13.2 years. The market size has the
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greatest impact on this outcome; recalling that the model does not assume purely
vertical FDI, this result is not really surprising.
If tax rate had been reduced all the way to 15% in the Czech Republic, incentive
parity would have decreased noticeably toward Hungary as well as toward Slovakia.
The CR could allow decreasing amount of INIs, admittedly at the risk of losing some
marginal investors in favour of Poland (with Poland, parity stays steadily above 10
years). If the incentive provision is fully stopped after tax reduction to 15%, parity
would not hold even vis-a`-vis Hungary and Slovakia, and it would not be convenient
for the investor in this model to invest in the CR. For instance vis-a`-vis Slovakia, the
Czech Republic would have to reduce CIT down to 6.5% to compensate the investor
for the abolition of present INIs.
3.2.6 Limitations & Extensions
It stands to reason that model results from Table 3.3 should be taken “with a grain
of salt”. We do not claim that incentive parity actually holds (or hold) in Central
Europe, it was merely an illustrative example. The model is very simple in method-
ology, also engaging only in a restricted number of parameters—certainly there is a
diﬀerent labor productivity among the examined countries, regardless of many other
FDI determinants. Each country has certain speciﬁc assets (e.g., location) impor-
tant for investors, but hardly quantiﬁable. The other possible improvement is to use
eﬀective instead of statutory corporate income tax rate.
Naturally, income tax relief is not the only form of INIs that governments keep
at disposition, although it is probably the most utilized one (Newton 2003). For
advanced countries, which usually prioritize ﬁnancial subsidies,8 such precondition
is particularly restrictive while in other countries, tax holidays make usually a no-
ticeable part of the whole INI. For instance according to the Czech Supreme Audit
Oﬃce report (SAOCR 2006, pg. 9), the CR provided CIT reliefs in the amount of
5,102 million CZK in 1998–2005, compared to ﬁnancial INIs of 247 million CZK. CIT
reliefs thus represented more than 95% of the total provided volume of INIs. However,
it might be useful to expand the model by other kinds of incentives, especially the
ﬁnancial ones.
3.3 The Optimal INI Model
3.3.1 Intuition and Methodology
While the model introduced in the last section formulated the minimal INI adequate
to keep investor indiﬀerent in decision-making between both countries, now we try to
determine how large INI is really optimal for the given country. With reference, inter
8One of the exceptions is for instance Singapore (Sieh Lee 1998).
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alia, to Blomstrom & Kokko (2003), we consider FDI as a public good associated
with externalities (naturally under certain circumstances, which is not a subject of
discussion here). For this chapter let us consider only positive FDI externalities—
positive productivity spillovers.
The model from the last chapter is solved from investor’s point of view—the gov-
ernment has only a possibility to change the volume of INIs in reaction to investor’s
proﬁt parity. In this model, we will approach the situation directly from the chosen
country’s view. Nevertheless, the attitude toward the problem will be opposite to
what is common in available literature. Very often we can encounter such a formu-
lation that—by means of incentives—governments buy spillovers (e.g. Newton 2003;
Ma 2007). Sometimes, the competition for FDI is directly compared to an auction:
the MNC auctions FDI, governments try to outbid each other (see Besley & Seabright
1999).
In such a case, one would assume INIs to be a form of a price which countries pay
for FDI, or directly for spillovers connected to it. Our approach in this chapter is,
however, not so straightforward. The introduced model is based on understanding
INIs as commodities of some kind produced by the government and demanded by
potential investors. Nevertheless, INIs of both countries are not identical for the
MNC—let us simply assume that the MNC perceives incentives of Country 1 and
Country 2 as diﬀerent, although related, goods. To formalize, we see a certain analogy
with the Cournot oligopoly model, because the way of maximization (modiﬁcations of
the oﬀered quantity) corresponds to our thinking about incentives-based competition
for FDI the best.
Why did we decide to interpret the issue precisely in this manner, quite diﬀerently
from formulations of existing models? If an MNC plans to invest, it usually makes a
list of several acceptable countries or regions. Their governments are then contacted
in an eﬀort to obtain the best INI possible (see, e.g., Oman 2000). At this stage,
FDI competition is reduced to the incentives-based rivalry concerning usually only a
few countries—therefore we consider oligopoly in our model. Since we want to apply
the Cournot oligopoly model, MNC’s inverse demand functions (quasiprice which the
MNC “pays” for INIs) need to be derived. However, we simply assume here that the
inverse demand functions have the shape described in the following paragraphs.
Let us divide host country’s beneﬁts from FDI into (i) productivity spillovers
and (ii) other eﬀects (nonexternalities). The MNC is aware of positive externalities
generated by its investments (denoted by ξ), but it cannot inﬂuence the size of such
spillovers (denoted by ξ). Hence this value will form the autonomous term in inverse
demand function (3.12). May the MNC’s willingness to pay for INIs refer to the other
FDI eﬀects in our model. These are determined by the MNC itself and can be either
positive or negative. The higher CIT rate in a certain country, the more willing the
MNC is to pay for INIs oﬀered by this country (the product of parameter αi and tax
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rate τi in (3.12) will have a positive inﬂuence). Higher tax burden in the country
providing INIs means that the incentive presents a higher utility for the investor—and
he is now willing to “pay” a higher quasiprice.
Analogically, the higher the CIT rate in the rival country, the less ready the MNC
is to pay for incentives of the ﬁrst country (the product of parameter βi and rival
country’s tax rate τj will be negative). As with the CIT increase in Country 2 the
MNC does not demand high incentives in Country 1 (Country 2 is getting ceteris
paribus less competitive and the negotiating power of Country 1 strengthens), its
willingness to pay for INIs of Country 1 decreases. Finally, the quasiprice will fall
with an increase of provided volume of INIs by the given country—the same as with
an increase of INIs of the rival country since the MNC perceives them as relatively
close substitutes. In other words, we assume downward-sloping demand curves.
3.3.2 Basic Assumptions
Assumption 3.6 (Separation). Consider the decision making to be separate for INIs and
the CIT rate. The latter is set exogenously and government seeks the optimal INI.
Assumption 3.7 (Exclusivity). The government has merely one form of INIs at its
disposal—the total CIT relief for Y years. Furthermore, tax holidays are granted
automatically so that each foreign investor can be sure to obtain them.
Assumption 3.8. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a model of duopoly com-
petitors. Both countries have certain speciﬁc assets for investors (e.g., a favorable
location), so that after a simultaneous reduction of incentives from the Cournot equi-
librium, investor does not decide to exit into a third country. Let the inverse demand
functions be linear in τi and Yi.
May the inverse demand functions for INIs be (see discussion in Subsection 3.3.1)
φi(Yi, Yj) = ξi + αiτi − βiτj − γiYi − δiYj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (3.12)
where ξi stands for spillovers, τi ∈ (0, 1) is statutory CIT rate in country i, and Yi
is the length of the total CIT relief in years. All the parameters are positive and it
is assumed that αi > βi > γi > δi holds. The reason is the following: taking into
account that investor’s preferences about the CIT rate and duration of tax holidays
probably do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly and since αi and βi inﬂuence the tax rate for
which the restriction τ ∈ (0, 1) holds, they should be higher than γi and δi. It is also
reasonable to assume that in each inverse demand function for country i’s INIs, τi has
higher impact than τj as well as the importance of Yi exceeds that of Yj , therefore
αi > βi and γi > δi holds.
To form a model, we need to choose a way of countries’ costs-of-incentives expres-
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sion. The methodology diﬀers; usually one can encounter an erosion of tax system
and home ﬁrms’ discrimination, since they are often unable to obtain INIs (Oman
2000). However, these factors can be quantiﬁed only with diﬃculties. In the present
paper, we use Wells et al. (2001): the costs of tax holidays can be understood as the
relief duration in years multiplied by the CIT rate, overall FDI coming to the country
(I), expected gross investment rate of return (J) and so-called redundancy rate (R):
TCi = τiRiIiJiYi, (3.13)
where Ri ∈ (0, 1] is that part of investors that would have come to the country even
without any INIs. Expression (3.13) then forms the lost tax income.
Assumption 3.9 (Weak INIs’ eﬃciency). The received incentive is for all investors the
smallest necessary to make them invest into the country.
Ii and Ri are dependent on Yi, so they are not parameters. R is in fact a function
of Y , comprehended in form of
R(Y ) = 1− w(Y ),
where w(Y ) stands for the function for which the following properties apply:
w ∈ C1(ℝ), w(0) = 0, lim
Y→∞
w(Y ) = 1, w′(Y ) ≥ 0, w′′(Y ) ≤ 0.
Lemma 3.1. If TCi = τiRiIiJiYi holds, then TCi = τiI0i JiYi holds as well, where I0i
is the investment volume in the case of nonexistence of INIs.
Explanation. If a country does not provide INIs, then R = 1; i.e., all investors nat-
urally come into the country without any INIs and I = I0. As soon as the country
starts to increase INIs, from the deﬁnition of R, incoming investment volume will
rise according to the equation I = I0 + (1 − R)I. Sensibility of investors to INIs
is represented by (1 − R), which is precisely w(Y ). Then, the investment can be
derived easily as I = I0/R and after insertion into (3.13), we obtain the desired
expression.
Assumption 3.10 (Symmetry). Spillover value and the average rate of return on in-
vestment is the same for both countries. In the case of nonexistence of INIs, let the
investment inﬂow be identical for both countries.
Assumption 3.11. Countries provide generic incentive schemes—we do not consider
for now that governments have a possibility to negotiate with individual investors.
Countries oﬀer INIs ex ante, being the same for all investors.
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3.3.3 Decentralized Equilibrium
Let both countries be Cournot duopolists maximizing their individual proﬁt. None
of the countries has perfect information about the exact volume of INIs oﬀered by the
second country at its disposal. The total revenue from INIs of Country 1 will then be
TR1(Y1, Y2) = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21 − δ1Y1Y2. (3.14)
Applying Lemma 3.1, the total costs of INIs will reach
TC1 = τ1I0JY1. (3.15)
On the basis of (3.14) and (3.15), one can formulate the proﬁt function (where
as the “proﬁt” we consider the utility of the given country from provided INIs):
Π1 = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21 − δ1Y1Y2 − Y1τ1I0J.
From the condition of the ﬁrst order, we solve for Y1 and obtain the reaction function
of Country 1:
Y1 =
ξ + α1τ1 − β1τ2 − δ1Y2 − τ1I0J
2γ1
. (3.16)
Similarly, let us derive the reaction function of Country 2:
Y2 =
ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I0J
2γ2
. (3.17)
Terms (3.16) and (3.17) give together a system of equations—two reaction curves.
The ﬁnal Cournot equilibrium will be reached in the point of intersection of these
curves. After modiﬁcations and substitution, the equilibrium value will have the
form of
Y C1 =
ξ(2γ2 − δ1) + τ1(2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I0J)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2
− τ2(2β1γ2 + α2δ1 − δ1I
0J)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 . (3.18)
Expression (3.18) sets the optimal volume of INIs for Country 1, provided no country
has “an advantage of the ﬁrst move” and no agreement is possible—we deal with a
simultaneous noncooperative one-shot game.
All propositions in this subsection are straightforward applications of equilibrium
condition (3.18). Let us start with the inﬂuence of spillovers.
Proposition 3.6. The amount of incentives under “free subsidy competition” in the
Cournot equilibrium is an increasing function of positive FDI spillovers.
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Proof. Let us simply diﬀerentiate (3.18):
∂Y C1
∂ξ
= 2γ2 − δ14γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 .
Being aware of the primary condition γi > δi, we get the result.
Proposition 3.7. If the CIT rate in country i (τi) exceeds at least one half of the CIT
rate in country j, then higher returns to investments lower the country i’s optimal
level of INIs.
Proof. Diﬀerentiation of (3.18) with respect to J yields
∂Y C1
∂J
= I
0(τ2δ1 − 2τ1γ2)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 .
Applying the condition γi > δi once again, the result is obvious. Notice that the
inﬂuence of I0 on Y C1 is exactly the same.
Proposition 3.8. The host country’s CIT rate has an ambiguous eﬀect on the optimal
level of INIs. The eﬀect tends to be negative if many MNCs are willing to invest into
the country even without any incentives and if the returns on such investments are
high.
Proof. It is necessary to diﬀerentiate (3.18) with respect to τ1:
∂Y C1
∂τ1
= 2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I
0J
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 .
The denominator of is positive, but we cannot say anything about the sign of the
nominator. This can be surprising because the CIT rate is naturally closely related
to tax incentives in MNCs’ decision-making and one would expect the inﬂuence to be
clearly positive. However, in the current model, the amount of lost taxation rises with
the increasing CIT and, on the other hand, the higher CIT, the more INIs investors
require since their net rate of return declines—see deﬁnition of the respective demands
in (3.12)—, which increases government’s revenue from the provision of INIs. The
total eﬀect is slight and unclear. Diﬀerentiation with respect to τ2 yields a very
similar formula with opposite signs—thus it seems that if τ1 increases Y1, τ2 tends
to decrease it, and vice versa.
Parameter γ1 raises the denominator in (3.18), but does not aﬀect the numerator,
thus the optimal volume of INIs decreases with its growth. Parameter δ2 has a
contrary inﬂuence; it decreases the denominator, but does not occur in the numerator.
It is not so simple to estimate the impact of other parameters; therefore we project
the performance of the model on an example and in particular on Table 3.4.
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Example 3.2. For illustration, let the Czech and Slovak republics be competitors and
the respective demand functions for INIs be symmetrical. Let us select the following
demand parameters: αi = 100, βi = 50, γi = 20, δi = 10. Spillovers are assessed to
be 400. Assume that the investment value which would come to the country even
without incentives is equal to 1000 and its average rate of return is 10%. In 2007,
the CIT rate was 19% in Slovakia and 24% in the Czech Republic. This example is
described in the ﬁrst row of Table 3.4—the optimal tax relief provided by the CR will
last for 7.8 years under these conditions. What happens if the spillover eﬀect rises
by 50% to 600? The optimal INI increases to 11.8 years.
3.3.4 Stackelberg Leadership
Admittedly, simultaneous game principle does not have to be fulﬁlled in practice.
Suppose that the government of Country 1 has “an advantage of the ﬁrst move”, so
that Country 1 is a quantity leader in the sense of Stackelberg. The country that is
the ﬁrst one to provide INIs in the region or which is the most successful in attracting
foreign investors can become such a leader. In the last decades, Singapore can serve
as an example for the region of Southeastern Asia (see Charlton 2003). Country 1
(leader) knows ex ante that Country 2 (follower) will react to its move. Government
in Country 1 knows the reaction function of Country 2:
Y2 =
ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I0J
2γ2
, (3.19)
Thus Country 1 uses the reaction function of Country 2 in its proﬁt function:
Π1 = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21
− δ1Y1 ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I
0J
2γ2
− Y1τ1I0J.
From the condition of the ﬁrst order we derive Y1 and get the optimal amount of
incentives in Country 1 for the leader of the sequential game:
Y S1 =
ξ(2γ2 − δ1) + τ1(2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I0J)
4γ1γ2 − 2δ1δ2
− τ2(2β1γ2 + α2δ1 − δ1I
0J)
4γ1γ2 − 2δ1δ2 . (3.20)
Proposition 3.9. Duration of tax relief in the case of the Stackelberg leadership stays
greater than in the case of Cournot competition.
Proof. The new term has a higher denominator, while the numerator stays the same,
therefore Y C1 < Y
S
1 always holds.
Analogically to the standard model of the Stackelberg leader, the results are
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higher provision of INIs and higher “income” for Country 1. Thanks to the similar-
ity of expressions, discussion of parameters inﬂuences of the Stackelberg equilibrium
will not be necessary because they will not diﬀer from the case of Cournot. Propo-
sition 3.6, Proposition 3.7, Proposition 3.8, and also all the conclusions made in the
discussion of (3.18) are valid here as well.
Example 3.3. Let all parameters be the same as in Example 3.2. The Czech Republic
and Slovakia are again duopolists providing INIs, but the Czech Republic is now the
Stackelberg leader—this modiﬁcation changes optimal duration of tax holidays to 8.4
years.
3.3.5 Supranational Coordination
Even if the absolute majority of theoretical works calls for some form of global reg-
ulation of INIs (see, inter alia, UNCTAD 1996), it has not appeared in a noticeable
extent till nowadays; apparently no credible threat for the case of violation of such
agreements exists.
A typical example can be found in Charlton (2003, pg. 29): in 1991, the states of
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut made an agreement on restrictions of incen-
tives for investors transferring their activities from one state to another. However,
New Jersey promptly violated this contract, trying to attract (by means of an incen-
tive of 50 million USD) First Chicago Corporation, which employed at that time 1,500
workers in the neighboring New York. New York reacted with even a more generous
incentive and made the company stay. As a result, the inter-state agreement lasted
for only four days.
Our model changes with the assumption of coordination. To maximize the com-
mon proﬁt from INIs, the supranational entity maximizes the proﬁt function
Π1+2 = ξY1 + α1τ1Y1 − β1τ2Y1 − γ1Y 21 − δ1Y1Y2 − Y1τ1I0J
+ ξY2 + α2τ2Y2 − β2τ1Y2 − γ2Y 22 − δ2Y1Y2 − Y2τ2I0J.
From the ﬁrst order condition with respect to Y1 we derive
Y1 =
ξ + α1τ1 − β1τ2 − δ1Y2 − τ1I0J − δ2Y2
2γ1
. (3.21)
Similarly from the ﬁrst order condition with respect to Y2 we calculate
Y2 =
ξ + α2τ2 − β2τ1 − δ2Y1 − τ2I0J − δ1Y1
2γ2
. (3.22)
In the case of both countries’ agreement, substituting (3.22) into (3.21) we obtain
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for Y1:
Y K1 =
ξ(2γ2 − δ1 − δ2) + τ1
[
2γ2(α1 − I0J) + β2(δ1 + δ2)
]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2
− τ2
[
2β1γ2 + (δ1 + δ2)(α2 − I0J)
]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2 . (3.23)
Example 3.4. Following Example 3.2, the chosen parameters and countries stay the
same. Providing both countries are able to agree on incentives-system coordination,
the optimal duration of incentive in the Czech Republic will decrease to 6.6 years.
However, this conclusion cannot be generalized.
Proposition 3.10. If both countries are able to coordinate their INI schemes, the oﬀered
INIs can either decrease or increase, depending mainly on the assumed spillover value.
Proof. This can be seen easily, e.g., from Table 3.4 which tests the sensibility of
model’s results to individual parameters. Through most of the modiﬁcations of our
example, the optimal tax-relief duration in the case of coordination stays lower than
in the decentralized equilibrium. But note the third line—in the case of coordination,
INI is higher for such selected parameters’ values.
Notice that Proposition 3.6 and Proposition 3.8 are valid even in the case of coor-
dination (for the same reasons as in the Cournot model).9 Also, γ1 aﬀects the optimal
incentive value negatively; nonetheless we cannot say anything about parameter δ2
prima facie—it occurs both in numerator and denominator of (3.23). Proposition 3.7
needs to be changed for the case of coordination:
Proposition 3.11. If the competition is subject to supranational coordination and the
CIT rate in country i (τi) exceeds the CIT rate in country j, then higher returns to
investments lower the country i’s optimal level of INIs.
Proof. Diﬀerentiation of (3.23) with respect to J yields
∂Y1
∂J
= I
0 [τ2(δ1 + δ2)− 2τ1γ2]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2 .
The result is obvious due to the initial conditions (see Footnote 9). Compared to
Proposition 3.7, the assumptions behind Proposition 3.11 are more restrictive.
9Illustration for Proposition 3.6:
∂YK1
∂ξ
= 2γ2−δ1−δ24γ1γ2−(δ1+δ2)2 , denominator can be written as (γ1γ2 −
δ21)+(2γ1γ2−2δ1δ2)+(γ1γ2−δ22), thus the whole derivative is clearly positive applying the condition
γi > δi.
3. On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives 62
3.3.6 Sensibility Analysis
We analyze the sensibility of the model in Table 3.4, proceeding analogously to
Section 3.2 (line 1 corresponds to our previous examples in this section, and in all
lines we have to respect the condition αi > βi and γi > δi). Results of optimal tax-
holidays period correspond to Country 1 and our modiﬁcations (ﬁrst column provides
the value for the Cournot equilibrium, the second one for the Stackelberg leadership,
the third column shows supranational coordination).
Table 3.4: Sensibility of the Optimal INI Model
Y C1 Y
S
1 Y
K
1 ξ α1 α2 β1 β2 γ1 γ2 τ1 τ2 J
7,8 8,4 6,6 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
11,8 12,7 9,9 600 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
0,1 0,1 0,2 10 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
10,4 11,1 9,8 400 500 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
7,3 7,8 5,8 400 10 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
7,3 7,8 5,3 400 100 500 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
7,9 8,5 6,8 400 100 10 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
5,5 5,9 3,7 400 100 100 500 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
8,0 8,6 6,8 400 100 100 10 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
8,5 9,2 8,4 400 100 100 50 500 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
7,8 8,3 6,4 400 100 100 50 10 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
3,0 3,1 2,2 400 100 100 50 50 50 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
10,7 11,7 9,8 400 100 100 50 50 15 20 0,24 0,19 0,1
9,4 9,5 9,3 400 100 100 50 50 20 100 0,24 0,19 0,1
5,6 6,6 0,1 400 100 100 50 50 20 10 0,24 0,19 0,1
7,9 8,5 6,8 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,5 0,19 0,1
7,8 8,3 6,4 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,1 0,19 0,1
7,4 7,9 6,0 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,5 0,1
7,9 8,5 6,7 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,1 0,1
7,3 7,8 6,1 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,2
8,1 8,7 6,8 400 100 100 50 50 20 20 0,24 0,19 0,05
Source: author’s computations in accordance to (3.18), (3.20) and (3.23).
From Table 3.4 let us comment only the most important ﬁndings. The change of
FDI externalities has a highly considerable impact on the optimal incentive quantity.
On the contrary, the inﬂuence of changes in parameters αi and βi of the demand
function appears to be insigniﬁcant. More substantial is the inﬂuence of γi. Increase
in γ1 causes comparatively noticeable fall in incentive duration for all modiﬁcations
(Cournot, Stackelberg leadership, collusion). Parameter γ2 works with a lower in-
tensity in the opposite direction. In this example, the CIT rate of Country 1 (Czech
Republic) exceeds that of Country 2 (Slovakia), thus higher return on investment (J)
means lower optimal INIs for the Czech Republic, although the eﬀect is not dramatic.
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3.3.7 Limitations & Extensions
Determining the costs of tax holidays, we started from Wells et al. (2001), who remind
that a lost tax income is not the only expense. An important issue is the latent form
of other costs, hard to be researched and separated into a longer period, i.e. diﬃcult
to quantify. If we admitted that such “lateral” costs could reach signiﬁcant values,
the model would have to be modiﬁed broadly.
The model has also another limitation—it would be interesting to loose the as-
sumption of equivalent spillover values for both countries and study how the changes
in diﬀerent levels of spillovers inﬂuence the result. Furthermore, the equal level of
I0—investments that ﬂow into the country independently of the provision of INIs—is
required for both countries. Parameter of investment rate of return J approximates
pii/F from the ﬁrst model. Initial Assumption 3.10 is again restrictive—nevertheless
a simple solution with diﬀerent values of Ji is possible.
Finally, (3.12) does not cover all the parameters that can inﬂuence investor’s
“willingness to pay” for INIs. It can include the price of labor, its qualiﬁcation,
macroeconomic or political stability, etc.; lots of FDI determinants can be envisioned
here.
Also, the simpliﬁcation hidden in Assumption 3.11 is very signiﬁcant—the coun-
try has to provide each foreign investor with equivalent INI. We do not consider
negotiations between the MNC and governments that race in oﬀering INIs to attract
investments—which is perhaps a relatively frequent phenomenon (see Oman 2000;
Charlton 2003). However, our assumption is justiﬁable because we model ﬁscal incen-
tives, particularly tax holidays—and because the legislation in taxation ﬁeld changes
diﬃcultly and relatively slowly in democratic countries, ﬁscal INIs use to be provided
via generic schemes (see OECD 2003).
It is useful to indicate what consequences an embodiment of negotiations between
the investor and involved countries during the decision-making process would bring
to the previous model (in other words, governments can decide ad hoc and oﬀer
incentives tailored to the needs of the MNC). Besides, if we suppose that governments
know their own minimal suﬃcient INI, we can illustrate the interaction between both
models. The summary is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Status quo (situation without INIs) is disrupted by some external factors in nodal
point A. If both countries choose cooperation, they get to point B—a situation of
“collusion” from our model, which satisﬁes the optimal INI supply Y K1 for Country
1. Let us label YMIN1 (Y K2 ) as the value of minimal suﬃcient incentive, which corre-
sponds to the given INI of the second country. If Y K1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y K2 ), Country 1 will
succeed in investment allurement. If the equality sets in, investor will be indiﬀerent
between both countries (incentive parity).
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Figure 3.1: The general model of INIs’ supply
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Source: author’s scheme on the basis of the presented models.
Proposition 3.12 (Unsustainability). Any collusion agreement can hold neither one
round if Y K1 = YMIN1 (Y K2 ) does not stand.
Proof. No country will willingly abandon all the chances to get FDI (if one does not
think about any kind of compensation). For more long-term stability, INIs of both
countries will be equal to their minimal suﬃcient INI.10
If countries do not cooperate, they will reach point C. Now each country sets
whether to provide generic or ad hoc INIs. If both countries decide for the ﬁrst
possibility, they meet in point D—the situation modeled by the Cournot competition.
Country 1 gains the investment if Y C1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y C2 ).
Let Country 1 decide to oﬀer INIs ad hoc, while Country 2 still uses a generic
scheme (point E).
Proposition 3.13. Expected utility of Country 1 in point E is higher or equal to its
expected utility in point D.
Proof. Country 1 has an evident strategic advantage: if Y C1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y C2 ), it de-
creases Y1 close to YMIN1 (Y C2 ), but can still oﬀer more convenient conditions to
investors. The MNC then chooses Country 1 which will moreover get better, com-
pared to the Cournot equilibrium. If Y C1 ≤ YMIN1 (Y C2 ), Country 1 still has a chance
of attracting the investment. It identiﬁes such a level of provided INIs by which its
total utility from transaction is equal to zero (marked as Yˆ1) and is willing to increase
Y1 until this point and gains the investment if Yˆ1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y C2 ).
10Realize that Y1 = YMIN1 (Y2) can be valid if and only if Y2 = YMIN2 (Y1). What is more, naturally
Y1 > Y
MIN
1 (Y2) can hold if and only if Y2 < YMIN2 (Y1) .
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The last possibility is that both countries provide INIs ad hoc (point F). For each
country individually it is optimal to select such a Y which will slightly exceed its
minimal suﬃcient incentive and so will attract investment with the smallest costs
possible. This process of action and reaction ends right in the point where at least
one country provides INIs for which Yi = Yˆi. If also Yˆi < YMINi (Yˆj), country i loses
investment for the beneﬁt of country j which will have positive utility from the whole
transaction.
Proposition 3.14 (Competition eﬃciency). If Yi = Yˆi as well as Yˆi = YMINi (Yˆj) hold,
perfect spillover internalization follows.
Proof. It comes to incentive parity; the investor is indiﬀerent between both countries
and the winner has zero utility from the transaction. The beneﬁt is fully taken away
by the investor because each country bids up to the spillover value.
Figure 3.1 also indicates that apart from the classical dilemma of cooperation-
noncooperation, another problem in the decision-making ﬁeld of the government can
exist which can have the nature of the prisoner’s dilemma. Each country hungers
for being Country 1 in point E—where it has broader margin of maneuver, since the
second country is not ﬂexible. If both countries strive for this ﬂexibility and oﬀer
INIs ad hoc (point F), apparently they will suﬀer in comparison to the situation of
generic provision (point D). In general, the winner will have to oﬀer a substantially
higher incentive.11
Point F represents (the only pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the game because
for none of the countries it pays oﬀ to deviate unilaterally from the strategy heading
to F. It implies that we should observe FDI competition “using all weapons”, i.e.
escalation of supplied incentives until the last competitor fails. However, ad hoc
application of INIs is often regulated. For example, Besley & Seabright (1999) discuss
restrictions of ad hoc incentives in the EU.
This implies that point D can be instead of F the equilibrium for country compet-
ing inside the EU—point B is still not accessible because of the prisoner’s dilemma,
points E and F are inaccessible because of regulation. While in point D countries
provide Cournot INIs, in point F supplied INIs are close or equal to countries’ minimal
suﬃcient INIs.
11Notice that movement from point D to point F can eventually pay oﬀ only to country i. Its
Cournot level of INIs must be under the minimum suﬃcient INI in point D, but moreover Yˆi >
YMINi (Yˆj) must hold. Only in case when Y C1 = YMIN1 (Y C2 ) & Yˆ1 = YMIN1 (Yˆ2), we have the pure
prisoner’s dilemma.
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3.4 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper is to contribute to a better comprehension of the inward
foreign direct investment incentives (INIs) phenomena by studying their determinants.
We introduced two simple microeconomic models, each dealing with a diﬀerent spec-
iﬁcation of the problem, and used them as tools for describing the foreign direct
investment policy-making.
The Minimal Suﬃcient INI Model, based on the proﬁt parity, is solved primarily
from the point of view of a foreign investor—the government’s task is only to set such
a level of INIs which does not threaten its relative competitiveness with respect to a
rival country. We have deduced that toward the equilibrium level of incentives, both
country’s corporate income tax (CIT) rate and the generosity of incentive systems of
its rival countries have a principal inﬂuence. Market size plays an important part as
well.
The Optimal INI Model was tackled from the point of view of a government max-
imizing public utility. The basis of the model lies in the application of the classical
models of oligopoly (Cournot, Stackelberg) to the situation of subsidy competition.
The most important conclusions include as the signiﬁcance of spillovers for explana-
tion of the optimal level of INIs, so the ambiguous inﬂuence of the corporate income
tax (CIT) rate. We show that possible supranational coordination of incentives can
either decrease or increase the supply of such subsidies, depending mainly on as-
sumed spillover value. Thus, using a diﬀerent methodology, we support the ﬁndings
of Hauﬂer & Wooton (2006).
Free competition between producers of INIs will lead to stimuli schemes of the
Minimal Suﬃcient INI Model. On the contrary, if their supply is regulated (e.g.,
by prohibition of ad hoc incentives), the equilibrium level corresponds to the Opti-
mal INI Model. This implies that on the background of the regulation of INIs, the
host country’s CIT rate does not have to represent a signiﬁcant determinant of the
provision of INIs.
Our results are sensitive to the assumed type of competition, which is equivalent
to the usage of the Cournot model. But the framework (in a nutshell, formalizing
INI as a commodity) is general enough to apply other models of oligopoly—starting,
e.g., with the Bertrand model. It would not be diﬃcult to allow for some broader
diﬀerences between the studied countries (i.e., relaxing Assumption 3.10), as well as
for non-linear investors’ demands in the CIT rate, modifying the deﬁnition of inverse
demand functions in (3.12). It is also possible to extend the analysis to more than
only 2 countries. Such modiﬁcations are left for further research.
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Chapter 4
Subsidy Competition for FDI:
Fierce or Weak?
4.1 Introduction
Although over a few recent years we might have been witnessing a stagnating interest
of economic theorists in foreign direct investment incentives—and some countries
seemingly saturated with foreign direct investment, e.g., the Czech Republic, have
even been considering reducing the beneﬁts for some types of foreign investors—,
it is not unlikely that the ongoing economic crisis will once again bring the topic
to the sunlight of international ﬁnancial community’s focus, as worldwide foreign
direct investment (FDI) is expected to drop signiﬁcantly (UNCTAD 2009). This is
the reason why we believe that it is important to study not only the eﬀectiveness of
investment incentives per se, but (aside from the traditional macroeconomic view)
also the microeconomic motivation which leads governments to use these instruments
of attracting foreign investors.
There are two rich streams of empirical literature related to the present paper.
The ﬁrst one concerns in FDI determinants (for a review, see, e.g., Blonigen 2005),
where the volume of inward FDI can be explained—among other things—by corpo-
rate income tax rates and sometimes also proxies for investment incentives. The
second stream of research focuses on empirical estimation of tax competition (for
instance, Devereux et al. 2008; Ghinamo et al. 2008), where countries’ tax rates are
inﬂuenced—aside from other factors—by FDI inﬂows and outﬂows or other countries’
tax rates. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical study concerning specif-
ically with the determinants of foreign direct investment incentives—i.e., taking a
proxy for FDI incentives as a response variable.
In this paper, we intend to empirically test the predictions of the models of
subsidy competition and supply of FDI incentives recently presented in Havra´nek
(2008) and compare it to the results of Havra´nek (2007), who tested older versions
4. Subsidy Competition for FDI: Fierce or Weak? 70
of these models using very basic cross-sectional methods. The theoretical models
distinguish cases of cooperation, weak competition, and ﬁerce competition; simple
hypotheses can be formulated to test for each of the scenarios separately. We are
going to employ (aside from the traditional regression methods) also iteratively re-
weighted least squares (Hamilton 2006) for cross-sectional data and Blundell & Bond
(1998) methodology for panel data. We do not prefer any particular model, but use
all the estimates obtained employing diﬀerent approaches to get a more stable overall
outcome.
The present paper is structured as follows: in Section 4.2, we summarize the
models developed by Havra´nek (2008) and formulate the most important hypothe-
ses. Section 4.3 describes the dataset that we have at our disposal and discusses
variables constructed on the basis of this data. In Section 4.4, the employed econo-
metric techniques and tests are described. Section 4.5 presents the results and a
corresponding discussion. Section 4.6 concludes the paper and lists a few limitations
of the used methodology.
4.2 Crucial Hypotheses
There are two—formally not entirely consistent,1 but still easily comparable—main
methodological approaches in Havra´nek (2008). The ﬁrst one is called “Minimal
suﬃcient investment incentive model” and predicts sharp competition between gov-
ernments up to the point where one country gives up or where both countries have
zero utility from attracting the foreign investor. It is based on a simple comparison
of alternative proﬁts—there are 2 countries and a monopolistic investor; the MNCs
invests in the country which assures him the highest return possible and the countries
try to match their attractiveness with the rival. The other one is called “Optimal
investment incentive model” and does not conclude that the competition between
rival countries necessarily has to be strong enough to shift all the beneﬁts emanating
from FDI spillovers to the foreign investor. This model is based on classical oligopolic
theories, where investment incentive is viewed as a commodity (i.e., governments are
oligopolies competing among each other). Finally, these models are integrated into
a more general one.
There are several possible outcomes of the general model. Either the governments
choose cooperation (which is equivalent to some sort of supranational coordination
in this case—this is in fact a special case of the Optimal investment incentive model),
or they both behave according to other versions of the models (the Minimal suﬃcient
investment incentive model or the “free competition version” of the Optimal invest-
ment incentive model), or each government uses a diﬀerent strategy. The situation
1The model of minimal suﬃcient investment incentive is dynamic, whereas the model of optimal
investment incentive is static.
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is depicted in Figure 3.1 in Havra´nek (2008). Surely, another possibility should be
added: that in reality the competition does not follow any of the models developed
in Havra´nek (2008). Thus we obtain the following set of outcome scenarios:
Scenario 1 There exists an eﬀective supranational coordination or governments are
cooperating (point B in Figure 3.1).
Scenario 2 The competition proceeds according to the “free competition version” of
the Optimal investment incentive model (point D in Figure 3.1). Based on the
discussion in the original paper, it can be labeled as weak competition.
Scenario 3 One country uses the Optimal investment incentive model, the other relies
on the Minimal suﬃcient investment incentive model (point E in Figure 3.1).
Scenario 4 The competition proceeds according to the Minimal suﬃcient investment
incentive model (point F in Figure 3.1). It can be labeled as ﬁerce competition.
Scenario 5 None of the models described in Havra´nek (2008) explains subsidy com-
petition reasonably well.
In the original paper, Scenario 3 was found to be highly improbable with respect
to the other options (it is much less stable); therefore, we will not test for it. Con-
cerning the others, there is a large number of propositions raised by Havra´nek (2008)
that can be straightforwardly tested. First, let us concentrate on Scenario 4. This
means that the Minimal suﬃcient investment incentive model has to be tested. The
central equation for this model is
INI1 =
1
ENT [M(1− CIT2) + INI2 · CIT2]−M(1− CIT1)
CIT1
, (4.1)
where INIi stands for tax relief, ENT stands for the relative quality of entrepreneurial
environment in Country 1 with respect to Country 2, M is duration of the investment,
and τi is the corporate income tax (CIT) rate; see Havra´nek (2008) for details. The
following hypotheses can be raised to support Scenario 42 (detailed explanations of
all variables used in this study can be found in Section 4.3):
 Provision of investment incentives is a decreasing function of the quality of
entrepreneurial environment (based on Proposition 3.1). H1 : ENT ↓
 Provision of investment incentives is an increasing function of labor costs (based
on Proposition 3.2). H2 : k ↑
 If country’s entrepreneurial environment is better than that of its rival, provi-
sion of investment incentives is an increasing function of the CIT rate (based
on Proposition 3.3, “Strong competition”). H3 : ENT > 1 ⇒ CIT1 ↑
2The simpliﬁcation behind these hypotheses is assumed linearity of the relationships.
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 Provision of country’s investment incentives is an increasing function of in-
vestment incentives provided by its rival (based on Proposition 3.4, “Regime
competition”). H4 : INI2 ↑
The hypotheses for Scenario 4 can be summarized as follows:
INI1 = f(
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
ENT,
+︷︸︸︷
k, CIT1,︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ if ENT > 1
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
INI2). (4.2)
Three of the hypotheses are unconditioned, one is conditioned—it will be tested
on a subsample of countries for which the condition applies. We simpliﬁed the concept
of entrepreneurial environment (ENT ) in the model to n/k (details are to be found
in Section 4.3). Concerning Scenario 2, the Optimal investment incentive model (to
be more speciﬁc, its “free competition version”) is used. The central equation of the
model is
INI1 =
SPILL(2γ2 − δ1) + CIT1(2α1γ2 + δ1β2 − 2γ2I0 · RET)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2
− CIT2(2β1γ2 + α2δ1 − δ1I
0 · RET)
4γ1γ2 − δ1δ2 , (4.3)
where INIi stands for investment incentives, SPILL stands for spillovers, RET return
on investments, CIT for the corporate income tax rate, and the rest are demand
parameters. The corresponding hypotheses are the following:
 Provision of investment incentives is an increasing function of FDI spillovers
(based on Proposition 3.6). H5 : SPILL ↑
 The CIT rate has an ambiguous eﬀect on the provision of investment incentives.
However, if the inﬂuence of country’s own CIT rate is negative, the inﬂuence of
its rival’s CIT tends to be positive, and vice versa (based on Proposition 3.8).
H6 : CIT1 ↑ ⇔ CIT2 ↓, CIT1 ↓ ⇔ CIT2 ↑
 If country’s CIT rate exceeds at least one half of its rival country’s CIT rate, then
the provision of investment incentives is a decreasing function of the return on
investments (based on Proposition 3.7). H7 : CIT1 > 12CIT2 ⇒ RET ↓
The hypotheses for Scenario 2 can be summarized as follows:
INI1 = f(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
SPILL, RET,︸ ︷︷ ︸
− if CIT1 > 12CIT2
opposite to CIT2︷ ︸︸ ︷
CIT1, CIT2︸ ︷︷ ︸
opposite to CIT1
). (4.4)
Let us turn our attention to Scenario 1. This is a special case of the Optimal
investment incentive model, labeled as “supranational coordination”. The central
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equation of the model is
INI1 =
SPILL(2γ2 − δ1 − δ2) + CIT1
[
2γ2(α1 − I0 ·RET ) + β2(δ1 + δ2)
]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2
− CIT2
[
2β1γ2 + (δ1 + δ2)(α2 − I0 ·RET )
]
4γ1γ2 − (δ1 + δ2)2 . (4.5)
The hypotheses are the same as for Scenario 2, with the exception of the last one
which now changes to the following statement:
 If country’s CIT rate exceeds its rival country’s CIT rate, then the provision
of investment incentives is a decreasing function of the return on investments
(based on Proposition 3.11). H8 : CIT1 > CIT2 ⇒ RET ↓
The hypotheses for Scenario 1 can be summarized as follows:
INI1 = f(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
SPILL, RET,︸ ︷︷ ︸
− if CIT1 > CIT2
opposite to CIT2︷ ︸︸ ︷
CIT1, CIT2︸ ︷︷ ︸
opposite to CIT1
). (4.6)
It is apparent that the hypotheses behind Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are very
similar and that it will be diﬃcult to distinguish between the two cases.3 Neverthe-
less, we believe that it is still meaningful to consider these two scenarios separately.
Finally, the hypothesis consistent with Scenario 5 is simple:
 No other scenario can be supported, which would be the case if our ﬁndings did
not support (or did even reject) majority of hypotheses for any of the 3 other
scenarios, or if the resulting support for hypotheses was in logical contradiction
(for instance, if H8 was supported and H7 was not).
4.3 Data and Variables Description
One reason why there probably has not been any study estimating determinants
of the provision of investment incentives is that it is very diﬃcult to obtain some
reliable data on the subject. Not surprisingly, most governments do not publish data
on how much money they provided to foreign investors—the ﬁeld seems to be quite
competitive. And even if they did with good faith, it would still be questionable,
since there are many forms of government support that cannot be directly quantiﬁed.
Governments can simply provide cash to the investors, but they can also oﬀer fuzzier
ﬁscal incentives, lower tax rates for MNC’s employees, infrastructure construction,
temporary wage subsidies, administrative help, easing of environmental or labor-
market related requirements, and so forth (see, inter alia, OECD 2003).
3H8 is in fact a stronger version of H7, thus the theory would suggest that if Scenario 1 is
supported, Scenario 2 should be technically supported as well. Of course, in such a case, Scenario 1
would be selected as the “proper” outcome.
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Being aware of the fact that there are—at least to our knowledge—no hard data
on the variable we are most interested in, we have to choose an alternative methodol-
ogy. In the World Competitiveness Yearbook, attractiveness of investment incentive
systems in many countries is evaluated every year. The evaluation has the form
of research survey; i.e., investors are asked which incentive systems they ﬁnd more
attractive and which less. The scale is 0–10, 0 for lowest attractiveness, 10 for the
best incentives. It has to be admitted that this is not an ideal measure of investment
incentives, nevertheless it is probably the best available one and should, in our opin-
ion, approximate the “real” variable even better than some hypothetical oﬃcial data
provided by governments.
We use the World Competitiveness Online database with time span 1997–2006
as the source of our data (with the exception of variable ENT which was obtained
from World Banks’ World Development Indicators). There are 61 cross-sectional
units in the dataset, but some of them are provinces of countries already included in
the dataset (Bavaria, Catalonia, Iˆle-de-France, Lombardy, Maharashtra, Sao Paulo,
Scotland, Zhejiang), hence we will exclude them from our dataset, since we have
data on their mother countries at our disposal. World Competitiveness data are also
strongly unbalanced and we have to exclude Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Jordan, Lux-
embourg, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Venezuela, and year 2006 to get a (strongly)
balanced panel.4 Finally, we are left with 44 countries observed during 1997–2005.
The explanatory variables needed for tests of the hypotheses raised in Section 4.2
are the following (the shortcuts that we use later in the regression model are typeset
in sans serif):
k The relative price of labor power in the original model. However, it is useful
to adjust it for diﬀerent labor productivity in rival countries. Therefore, the
deﬁnition we use here is
kit =
PRODRIVit /WAGES
RIV
it
PRODit/WAGESit
, (4.7)
where PRODit is labor productivity (GDP in USD at PPP per person employed
per hour) for country i and year t, WAGESit stands for labor costs (wages +
supplementary beneﬁts, USD) in country i and year t, and the other variables
correspond to the rival country. The higher k is, the less competitive our
country becomes with respect to the rival country and vice versa.
SPILL The value of spillovers that country receives from foreign direct investment in
the original model. This is the most problematic variable to measure (even more
than investment incentives), since there is not even a consensus upon whether
4Data on those countries from this source are so incomplete that they cannot be used for any
reasonable panel study.
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productivity spillovers from FDI are positive and/or signiﬁcant (see, inter alia,
Havra´nek & Irsˇova´ 2008).5 Nevertheless, there are theoretical approaches to
measure the absorption capacity of economies with respect to FDI spillovers. For
example, we can use a measure that could be called “macro-level technology
gap”:
TGAPit =
PRODMAXt − PRODit
PRODMAXt
, (4.8)
which is based roughly on Kokko (1994) (here deﬁned at the macro level, how-
ever; much more about technology gap can be found in Sjo¨holm 1999). PRODit
stands for labor productivity in country i and year t, PRODMAXt for the high-
est labor productivity in the sample for year t. The standard hypothesis is
that broader technology gap prevents the economy from receiving FDI spillo-
vers (thus we can use −TGAP in our model as a measure of positive spillovers).
Another way—and that is what we focus on—can be to rely on the knowledge
adoption concept. In this paper, we apply the knowledge adoption function
used by Papageorgiou (2002).6 The function is described by (4.9) and depicted
in Figure 4.1.
SPILLit = max
0,
(1 + b)PRODMAXt
PRODit
−
(
PRODMAXt
PRODit
)2
− b
. (4.9)
Figure 4.1: Assumed mechanism of spillover adoption
Adoption of spillovers
0 b 1 PROD/PROD
MAX
It should be noted that Papageorgiou (2002) does not deal with FDI spillovers
directly in his paper; he employs a general knowledge/technology adoption
concept. We use this function because we believe that it could describe the
absorption capacity of economies reasonably well. Signiﬁcantly undeveloped
countries have no or very limited possibility to enjoy productivity spillovers
5In this paper, we consider only positive FDI spillovers.
6This can become a subject of criticism since the function is deﬁned ad hoc, without any elaborate
underlying theory. However, we believe that the intuition in this case is reasonable enough.
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from foreign investments, because the technological diﬀerence between investors
and domestic ﬁrms are too large to be overcome ceteris paribus. The coeﬃ-
cient b determines how productive (relatively to the most productive country
in the sample) a country has to be to begin exploiting FDI spillovers. We con-
sider 2 diﬀerent values of b, speciﬁcally 0.25 (forming variable SPILLA) and
0.5 (variable SPILLB).
ENT Relative quality of entrepreneurial environment. In the original model, it is
a rather complex formula covering market size, labor costs, transaction costs,
and demand parameters. For the purpose of this paper, we decided to simplify
the formula to n/k, where n stands for the relative size of country’s market (the
country has n-times higher GDP in terms of purchasing power parity than its
rival), and k for the relative price of labor (adjusted for diﬀerent labor produc-
tivity, see above). If n/k exceeds 1, we conclude that country’s entrepreneurial
environment is better than that of its rival.7 This approximately covers the
idea of “entrepreneurial environment” in Havra´nek (2008).
CIT1 Statutory corporate income tax in the country.
CIT2 Statutory corporate income tax in the rival country.
RET Rate of return on investment. The assumption in the original model (rather
restrictive) is that the country and its competitor have the same rate of return
on investments. In our case, that would mean the same rate of return for all the
countries (countries do not necessarily create “competing pairs”, one country
can be the rival for many others, see the concept of rival country below), but
then it would not be meaningful to include rate of return into the regression
since we would have only observations from 9 years at our disposal. Therefore,
we decided to split the sample into 3 parts according to the geographical po-
sition of the countries—the Americas, Europe (+ Middle East), and Asia (+
Oceania). Variable RET for each country is then driven by real interest rate
of the leading ﬁnancial power of the group: USA for the Americas, Germany
for Europe, and Japan for Asia. Because in almost all cases countries compete
within these groups, the model’s assumption is not violated in principal.
INI1 Foreign direct investment incentives in the country.
INI2 Foreign direct investment incentives in the rival country.
Rival country When constructing the variables, one of the most important concepts
was the deﬁnition of “rival country”. Probably the easiest and most intuitive way
7The term “entrepreneurial environment” is only a label used by Havra´nek (2008) to refer to the
aforementioned formula, not the other way round.
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is to combine the geographic and cost perspectives. Let us imagine, for instance,
an automobile manufacturer planning its investment in central Europe. It certainly
considers the cost and productivity of labor (the higher PROD/WAGES, the better),
but it also highly values proximity to its main markets—logistics plays a signiﬁcant
role (not only) in the auto industry. Thus we can often witness two neighboring
countries, similar in productivity and labor costs, competing for an investment.
Based on this example, we constructed the following mechanism: preferably, the
rival country to country i should be one of its neighbors. Among them, the one with
ratio PROD/WAGES closest to that of country i is chosen. If there is no neighbor
of country i in our sample or if country i is an island, we choose from the group of 3
countries that are closest to its shore. Generally, the result of this algorithm might
vary each year for a particular country. We made the simpliﬁcation of computing the
result only for year 2005 and holding the rival country constant through time span
1997–2005.
Control variables In the World Competitiveness Online database, there are other
variables that could signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the level of provided investment incentives
as well. We concentrated on the following 5 of them:
FDI Total stock of inward FDI divided by total GDP (PPP). The hypothesis we raise is
that country saturated with FDI is less willing to provide substantial incentives
to foreign investors. H9 : FDI ↓
RISK Deﬁned as the risk of relocation of production facilities from the country. It
can be assumed that the higher risk of relocation the government feels, the
higher incentives it is willing to provide to foreign investors. H10 : RISK ↑
CLEG Eﬃciency of competition legislation in preventing unfair competition. The
hypothesis is that countries with poor legislation have to provide much higher
incentives to foreign investors as an oﬀset. H11 : CLEG ↓
BUDGET Country’s budget surplus/deﬁcit. The hypothesis is that countries with
substantial budget deﬁcits are not able or willing to provide high investment
incentives. H12 : BUDGET ↑8
GDPG Real GDP growth in the country. We expect that countries experiencing fast
GDP growth do not need FDI as much as countries with sluggish growth, hence
they will also not desire to provide high investment incentives. H13 : GDPG ↓
8On the other hand—if greenﬁeld investments account for only a small portion of total (potential)
FDI inﬂow, it might be tempting for indebted governments to provide incentives to foreign investors
that are willing to buy privatized companies, and thus bring quick cash.
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4.4 Methods of Estimation
In an attempt to test the hypotheses introduced in Section 4.2, we construct a linear
regression model. We use both cross-sectional techniques for 2005 and panel data
approaches for the whole time span 1997–2005. First, it appears that variables
BUDGET and GDPG do not bring any value added to explaining variance in INI1
in any of the speciﬁcations that we employ. Since we only intended to use them as
control variables and they are not important for the testing of our main hypotheses,
we exclude them from the regression. Therefore, the model reduces to
INI1it = α+ β1kit + β2SPILLAit + β3ENTit
+ β4CIT1it + β5CIT2it + β6RETit + β7INI2it
+ β8FDIit + β9RISKit + β10CLEGit + it, (4.10)
where we have i = 1, . . . , 44; t = 1997, . . . , 2005.
Acronyms of all used variables can be found in Table 4.7 in the Appendix to
the present chapter (Section 4.A) and their detailed description in Section 4.3. The
speciﬁcation introduced in (4.10) will be called complete. The pure speciﬁcation will
label the situation when we exclude all 3 control variables (FDI, RISK, CLEG) from
the model and keep only those regressors that we need to test the hypotheses from
Section 4.2. The best speciﬁcation will be unique for each method of estimation and
will be formed in such a way that the resulting model includes as many signiﬁcant
explanatory variables as possible.9 Some of our hypotheses are conditioned; therefore,
we need to deﬁne the conditions we are using:
Condition 1 ENT > 1
Condition 2 CIT1 > 12CIT2
Condition 3 CIT1 > CIT2
Apart from SPILLA, we will also try to use alternative measures for spillovers,
namely SPILLB and TGAP. It should be noted that TGAP is a measure for neg-
ative spillovers, since the theory suggests that the higher technology gap, the lower
opportunities for domestic ﬁrms to beneﬁt from inward foreign direct investment.
As a consequence, we should observe opposite signs of the estimates for SPILLA
(or SPILLB) and TGAP. The alternative measures will be applied to the complete
model and if the model shows higher performance, these alternatives will be used in
other speciﬁcations as well.
9The best speciﬁcation is not crucial for our later discussion. Its purpose is to extract the closest-
as-possible empirical match for the response variable; it can be also viewed as a robustness check
(abrupt changes of polarities or signiﬁcances might suggest problems with the complete speciﬁcation).
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Cross-sectional methods We start with the year 2005 and standard cross-sectional
approaches, beginning with OLS. We have 44 observations at our disposal; all com-
putations were conducted in Stata 10. The data as well as the source code can be
found on the enclosed DVD (Appendix B) and the thesis website. First, let us focus
on the problem of collinearity. Table 4.8 in the Appendix to this chapter shows cor-
relation coeﬃcients between explanatory variables. None of them exceeds 0.5, which
is a safe value. The condition number of the complete model reaches 43.8, which is
above the usual threshold of 30—nonetheless, it is not drastically excessive and in
other speciﬁcations falls well below 30 (24.5 for the best model).
Table 4.1: Linear and non-linear relationships
Variable Linear Polynomial
Relative price of labor 0.12 0.45
Spillover absorption capacity (b = 0.25) 0.21 0.49
Quality of entrepreneurial environment 0.14 0.45
Corporate income tax 0.34 0.59
Rival’s corporate income tax 0.24 0.50
Return on investment 0.15 0.35
Rival’s investment incentives 0.28 0.52
FDI stock on GDP 0.38 0.69
Risk of relocation 0.10 0.37
Eﬃciency of competition legislation 0.27 0.66
Considering possible non-linear relationships, we use the Weierstrass Approxi-
mation Theorem (see Vı´ˇsek 1997, p. 71) and estimate J following regressions (we
regress powers of explanatory variables of (4.10) on each other; t = 2005):
Xim = α+
J∑
j=1
P∑
p=1
βjpX
p
ij + ϑi, i = 1, . . . , N, m = 1, . . . , J, m 6= j. (4.11)
We computed (4.11) with J = 10 and P = 6, the coeﬃcients of determination of
such regressions are listed in Table 4.1 together with what is usually called linear
redundancy (i.e., with P = 1). Most of the values oscillates around 0.5, the highest
number is 0.69, which is also not excessive—thus we can conclude that, although
there is some increase compared to linear redundancy, non-linear dependencies among
explanatory variables should not represent a signiﬁcant problem in our regressions.
To deal with possible heteroscedasticity of disturbances, we employ heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator,
see Huber (1967) and White (1980). In order to test for normality of disturbances
of the complete model, we use the Shapiro-Wilk test, which unfortunately rejects
the null hypothesis at the 5% level. We tried to employ several transformations,
but the result did not change signiﬁcantly. Ramsey RESET test (which tests for
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omitted variables and can be also interpreted as a test of linearity) does not reject
the null hypothesis of no omitted variables at the 5% level. These tests provide us
with identic results in the case of the best model as well.
The results of OLS estimation can be found in Table 4.2. One the one hand,
the coeﬃcient of determination oscillates around 0.5, which is not a small number
considering the nature of the data. On the other hand, there are only few signiﬁcant
explanatory variables. The best model was obtained by gradual excluding the most
insigniﬁcant explanatory variables until further exclusions would lower the number
of signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) regressors. It should be also noted that applying
Condition 1 and Condition 3, we obtain only 17 (and 16, respectively) observations
we can use—this does not give us enough degrees of freedom to take these regres-
sions very seriously. Conversely, Condition 2 is much less restrictive and leaves 43
observations for the regression.
Until now, we did not discuss data contamination, and OLS was performed us-
ing all observations as a benchmark case. Now let us focus on a robust method—
iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRLS). Details about this estimator can be found
for example in Hamilton (2006, pp. 239–256). It can be explained easily in the fol-
lowing way: ﬁrst, OLS is estimated and we exclude observations with Cook’s distance
higher than 1. Then we calculate weights using a Huber function—it assigns lower
weights to observations with large residuals. We perform weighted least squares and
after a few iterations, we shift the weight function to a Tukey biweight function tuned
for 95% Gaussian eﬃciency. For estimating standard errors and testing hypotheses,
IRLS uses a pseudovalues method that does not assume normality.
Estimates with the help of IRLS are summarized in Table 4.3. Results are quite
diﬀerent from OLS, that is why we suspect there can be inﬂuential outliers in the
data and decide to rely more on IRLS.
Panel data techniques Now let us turn our attention to the whole period 1997–
2005. First, we perform a test of poolability using a variant of the Chow test with
ﬁxed eﬀects as the null hypothesis. The test of poolability is important, because ﬁxed
eﬀects also impose restrictions on the structure of the model, and it is not suﬃcient
to employ only Hausman test to choose between ﬁxed eﬀects and random eﬀects (see
Baltagi 2005, p. 19). The Chow test does not reject the null hypothesis at the 5%
level; therefore, pooling of our data does not seem unreasonable. Then we employ the
Hausman test to determine whether or not it would be more appropriate to use the
random eﬀects model instead of ﬁxed eﬀects. The resulting test statistic is 53.4, thus
the null hypothesis is rejected powerfully—we should use the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator.
We would like to identify at least the most inﬂuential outliers in our data, thus
we choose the following approach: pooled OLS is performed and Cook’s distance and
residuals computed for each observation. In the next step, we order observations
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according to the absolute value of residuals and Cook’s distance. It is apparent that
especially values for Russia and Hong Kong (both Cook’s distance and residuals)
are very excessive for most of the years; therefore, we label these two groups of
observations as possible outliers. There are (at least) 2 problems with this approach:
ﬁrstly, there is the so-called masking eﬀect (Bramati & Croux 2007), which means
that outliers can aﬀect the non-robust estimator in such a way that any diagnostic
based on this estimator is not capable of detecting them. Secondly, we identiﬁed
the outliers on the basis of pooled OLS, but we are going to employ the ﬁxed eﬀects
model. Certainly one can ﬁnd many proposed robust estimators for ﬁxed eﬀects,
for example in Bramati & Croux (2007), but these are still not widely used. Hence
we will simply compare the result of our model with “outliers” speciﬁed above to a
speciﬁcation without them and choose the one with better performance.
Comparing the results of ﬁxed eﬀects estimates with and without spillovers, we
conclude that the speciﬁcations without spillovers are preferable (the models have
much more signiﬁcant explanatory variables and also coeﬃcients of determination are
usually higher). We present the results of ﬁxed eﬀects without outliers in Table 4.4
and leave speciﬁcations with all observations for the Appendix to the present chapter
(Table 4.9, Section 4.A). We can see that, compared to cross-sectional estimators
in 2005, much more explanatory variables are signiﬁcant now. We have a suﬃcient
number of degrees of freedom to test more reliably also our hypotheses connected to
Condition 1 and Condition 3.10
The performance of the model could increase signiﬁcantly if we added a lagged
value of the response variable to the set of explanatory variables. We cannot esti-
mate such a model using ordinary ﬁxed eﬀects, though. By construction, unobserved
panel-level eﬀects are correlated with the lag of explanatory variable, which makes
the standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimator inconsistent. Taking this into account, we could
use the estimator developed by Arellano & Bond (1991), which is based on general
method of moments. But as Blundell & Bond (1998) note, the Arellano & Bond
(1991) estimator can produce misleading results in some cases (e.g., if the autore-
gressive parameter is large). Therefore, we will employ a more “robust” estimator
developed by Blundell & Bond (1998), who build on Arellano & Bover (1995).
Because SPILLA was not found to be signiﬁcant in the complete model whilst
SPILLB was, the rest of the speciﬁcations (with the exception of the best speciﬁ-
cation, naturally) was computed using SPILLB instead of SPILLA. When we com-
pare the speciﬁcations with all observations with the ones without outliers, it seems
that the models with all observations perform better. Their results can be found
in Table 4.5—now majority of regressors are signiﬁcant. The speciﬁcations without
outliers are left for the Appendix to this chapter (see Table 4.10, Section 4.A). As
10Application of these conditions will introduce slight unbalancedness to the corresponding speci-
ﬁcations, but it should not be systematic.
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a benchmark, we also computed the models using the older Arellano & Bond (1991)
estimator (Table 4.11 in Section 4.A).
4.5 Discussion of Results
In Section 4.4, we employed various econometric techniques to get more stable overall
results. Most of the hypotheses from Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 are very easy to
test (including H1, H2, H4, H5, H9, H10, H11). Simple t-tests—or their alternatives in
the case of non-OLS regressions—are applied on the complete model. If the estimate
of the coeﬃcient of the variable in question is found to be signiﬁcant and in line
with our hypothesis, we say that the particular method of estimation supports the
hypothesis (of course, that does not mean that we would accept the hypothesis). If
the estimate is found to be signiﬁcant but in contrast to the hypothesis, we say that
the hypothesis is rejected. If the estimate is not signiﬁcant, then we cannot support
nor reject the hypothesis, thus we say it is not rejected and the test is inconclusive.
If the estimate is not signiﬁcant in the complete model, we ﬁrst look at the best and
pure speciﬁcations. When it gains signiﬁcance in one of them, we use that particular
speciﬁcation.11
However, some of the hypotheses are conditioned (including H3, H6, H7, H8). H6
is a special case; we say that it is supported when at least one of the explanatory
variables CIT1 and CIT2 is signiﬁcant, their estimated signs are opposite, and the
hypothesis γ1 + γ2 = 0, where the gammas are the respective regression coeﬃcients,
cannot be rejected at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. H3, H7 and H8 are tested on
subsamples of observations satisfying Condition 1, Condition 2, and Condition 3,
respectively.
We tried diﬀerent deﬁnitions of spillovers (SPILLA, SPILLB, TGAP). The es-
timated coeﬃcient was rarely found to be signiﬁcant; never in the case of TGAP.
Nonetheless, the estimated signs of SPILLA (or SPILLB) and TGAP diﬀer in all
cases, which is quite logical. What is not in line with the theory, however, is that—for
example, using the Blundell-Bond estimator—the estimated coeﬃcient for SPILLB
is negatively signiﬁcant.
The results are summarized in Table 4.6. It is apparent that, in the case of OLS,
the tests are mostly inconclusive. There are more signiﬁcant outcomes for IRLS and
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, but mainly for Blundell-Bond estimator.
Scenario 4 Starting with H1 (provision of investment incentives is a decreasing
function of the quality of entrepreneurial environment), we can see that while cross-
sectional techniques for 2005 do not reject the hypothesis, panel data methods reject
11Nevertheless, it should be noted that if we took into account only the complete speciﬁcations,
our results concerning the support for scenarios would not change.
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Table 4.6: Summary of conducted regressions and tests
Hypothesis OLS IRLS FE BB Result
Scenario 4 inconclusive
H1 : ENT ↓ NR NR R R reject
H2 : k ↑ S S S S strongly support
H3 : ENT > 1 ⇒ CIT1 ↑ NR NR NR R weakly reject
H4 : INI2 ↑ NR NR NR S weakly support
Scenario 2 inconclusive
H5 : SPILL ↑ NR NR S R inconclusive
H6 : CIT1 ↑ ⇒ CIT2 ↓ NR S NR S support
H7 : CIT1 > 12CIT2 ⇒ RET ↓ NR NR R R reject
Scenario 1 weakly support
H5 : SPILL ↑ NR NR S R inconclusive
H6 : CIT1 ↑ ⇒ CIT2 ↓ NR S NR S support
H8 : CIT1 > CIT2 ⇒ RET ↓ NR S R NR inconclusive
Other
H9 : FDI ↓ R R R NR strongly reject
H10 : RISK ↑ R R R R strongly reject
H11 : CLEG ↓ R R R R strongly reject
Note: R stands for reject, NR for not reject, and S for support.
Fixed eﬀects were computed without outliers, Blundell-Bond estimator using all obs.
it in both cases. Weighting all these results equally, we have to reject this hypothe-
sis.12 H2 (provision of investment incentives is an increasing function of labor costs) is
supported by all techniques—as the only one. Countries have to compensate foreign
investors for high unit costs and low productivity. H3 (if country’s entrepreneurial
environment is better than that of its rival, provision of investment incentives is an
increasing function of the CIT rate) can be weakly rejected, since only the Blundell-
Bond estimator rejects the hypothesis and other estimates are inconclusive. Con-
versely, H4 (Provision of country’s investment incentives is an increasing function of
investment incentives provided by its rival) is weakly supported.
Combining all these results, we cannot entirely reject Scenario 4, but we cannot
support it either. Two of the hypotheses are supported (strongly or weakly), the other
two are rejected. Support for H4 may indicate some level of regime competition, but
it is not strong as only one of the estimators is signiﬁcant.
Scenario 2 Let us continue withH5 (provision of investment incentives is an increas-
ing function of FDI spillovers)—cross-sectional methods cannot reject the hypothesis,
whereas ﬁxed eﬀects estimator supports the hypothesis and Blundell-Bond estimator
12In most cases, the deﬁnition of weights does not matter a lot (and excluding basic OLS as least
reliable would not aﬀect the results at all); therefore, we will continue to weigh the methods equally,
for simplicity.
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rejects it. Taken altogether, the tests are inconclusive. H6 (if the inﬂuence of coun-
try’s own CIT rate is negative, the inﬂuence of its rival’s CIT tends to be positive, and
vice versa) is supported, since OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects are inconclusive and the other
estimators are supportive. H7 (if country’s CIT rate exceeds at least one half of its
rival country’s CIT rate, then the provision of investment incentives is a decreasing
function of the return on investments) is rejected because of both panel data models.
One hypothesis is rejected, one is supported, the other cannot be rejected; hence
our evaluation of Scenario 2 will be similar to Scenario 4: the evidence is inconclusive.
Scenario 1 Concerning this scenario, H5 and H6 apply for it as well. The only
diﬀerence between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is that instead of H7 we now have
H8 (if country’s CIT rate exceeds its rival country’s CIT rate, then the provision of
investment incentives is a decreasing function of the return on investments) which
cannot be rejected by OLS and Blundell-Bond estimator, is supported by IRLS, and
rejected by ﬁxed eﬀects; so the outcome is inconclusive.13
Taken altogether, Scenario 1 is weakly supported, as 2 hypotheses cannot be
rejected and one is supported. Note, however, that the support for H8 in IRLS was
derived using very small number of degrees of freedom. Should we take into account
only panel data estimates, the result would be inconclusive.
Control variables Variables FDI, RISK, and CLEG were added to the model to im-
prove the speciﬁcation and increase explanatory power; nevertheless, we made some
intuitive hypotheses about their inﬂuence on INI : H9 (country saturated with FDI
is less willing to provide incentives), H10 (the higher risk of relocation the govern-
ment feels, the higher incentives it is willing to provide), and H11 (countries with
poor legislation have to provide higher incentives). These intuitive expectations are
obviously out of accord with our results; all three hypotheses are strongly rejected.
To sum it up, we cannot test for Scenario 3, there is no conclusive evidence for
Scenario 4 (stronger competition) nor Scenario 2 (weaker competition), and only
very little support for Scenario 1 (cooperation). Therefore, the evidence might sug-
gest that governments’ cooperation or supranational coordination could be—to some
extent—eﬀective. However, the present author would argue that it is much more
probable for Scenario 5 to be valid, i.e., none of the models developed by Havra´nek
(2008) is able to describe subsidy competition reasonably well. Thus, unfortunately,
we cannot say anything speciﬁc about the strength of the competition.
13Moreover, as H0 is theoretically a stronger case of H7, a support for H8 should also imply
support for H7. Since this is not the case, our ﬁndings are consistent with Scenario 5.
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4.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to empirically verify/falsify models of subsidy competi-
tion and supply of investment incentives developed in Havra´nek (2007) and Havra´nek
(2008) and critically evaluate similar attempts made by Havra´nek (2007). Whereas
the last mentioned paper concludes that the optimal investment incentive model can
reasonably explains subsidy competition, our results indicate that none of the mod-
els can be supported. The present author would argue that the contradiction arose
mainly due to the following factors:14
1. Interpretation of results by Havra´nek (2007). He found CIT1 to be insigniﬁcant
and CIT2 to be signiﬁcant—but that ﬁnding, in general, does not support the
model of optimal investment incentive.
2. Hypotheses tested by Havra´nek (2007). INI1 is not monotonous in the size of
the domestic market; it is better to use entrepreneurial environment instead. It
is also important to test for the signiﬁcance of RET and k and use conditional
hypotheses where it is appropriate.
3. Deﬁnition of a rival government used by Havra´nek (2007). Neighboring country
providing highest investment incentives does not have to be the rival; much
more probably it would be a country with as close PROD/WAGES as possible.
Also, the deﬁnition of the proxy for spillovers used by Havra´nek (2007) is
inappropriate.
4. Reliance on basic OLS by Havra´nek (2007). It is more suitable to check also
results of panel data estimators for the whole available time span, robust esti-
mators, and diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the models. While Havra´nek (2007) runs
only 3 basic OLS regressions, we try 48 diﬀerent speciﬁcations and employ 5
alternative estimators.
However, we also made multiple simpliﬁcations throughout this paper. In the ﬁrst
place, we formulated our hypotheses as linear dependences, although in a few cases
the theoretical relationship is rather complex. We used a very simple deﬁnition of
entrepreneurial environment and in a similar way we derived a proxy for productivity
spillovers.
It is also necessary to take into account the nature of the data on investment
incentives we have at our disposal; i.e., we are dealing with the attractiveness of
incentives and not with the provided amounts per se. Also, our deﬁnition of the
variable RET might be seen as oversimplifying and problematic.15 Another problem
14Of course, Havra´nek (2007) was testing an older form of the models; however, the basic rela-
tionships remain similar.
15Note the simplifying assumption of zero discount rate in Havra´nek (2008).
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with this approach could be that tax holidays (which are considered in the underlying
models) are not the only form of investment incentives appreciated by investors.
Possible caveats can be also raised to our research methodology; most notably,
the discretion in deﬁning weights for diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see Table 4.6 and cor-
responding comments) or standard testing of hypotheses in the case of OLS when
normality was previously rejected, though. In spite of that, the present author would
argue that it is safe to say that—using the World Competitiveness Online Database—
there is no signiﬁcant empirical evidence supporting models presented in Havra´nek
(2008). The only stronger claim that we can formulate based on the analysis of this
data is the following: It seems that by means of FDI incentives governments try to
compensate MNCs for high labor costs and low productivity in their countries.
Therefore, even if the models clearly distinguish cases of weak competition, co-
operation, and ﬁerce competition, all of which are empirically testable, we cannot
make a strong conclusion about the nature of the competition with the data which
we have at our disposal. There is some minor evidence for cooperation, but this
result is rather unstable. Nevertheless, we suggest testing the models using diﬀerent
datasets and diﬀerent methodologies.
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4.A Supplementary Tables
On the following pages, a few illustrative tables are provided.
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Table 4.7: Acronyms of regression variables
Variable Explanation
k The relative price of labor adjusted for diﬀerent productivity.
spilla Spillover absorption capacity with b = 0.25.
spillb Spillover absorption capacity with b = 0.5.
tgap Spillover absorption capacity measured as technology gap.
ent Relative quality of entrepreneurial environment.
cit1 Corporate income tax rate.
cit2 Corporate income tax rate in the rival country.
ret Return on investment.
ini1 Attractiveness of investment incentives.
L.ini1 Lagged value of attractiveness of investment incentives.
ini2 Attractiveness of investment incentives in the rival country.
fdi Stock of inward FDI divided by total GDP.
risk Risk of relocation of production from the country.
cleg Quality of competition legislation.
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Appendix B
Content of Enclosed DVD
There is a DVD enclosed to this thesis which contains used empirical data, Stata and
LATEX source codes, and simulations of models’ sensitivity in Excel. All this content
can also be found on the thesis website: www.tomashavranek.cz/research/master-
thesis.
 Folder 1: Empirical data
 Folder 2: Source codes
 Folder 3: Sensitivity simulations
